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Sport is an integral part of American culture' and violence has
become, over the years, a major element in many sports.2 Commen-
* A.B., 1979, Harvard College; J.D., 1982, Georgetown University. The author is a law
clerk to United States District Judge Gerald Weber.
** B.A., 1979, University of Wisconsin; J.D., 1983, M.S.F.S., 1983, Georgetown
University.
This article was developed from an essay submitted in 1982 as part of a course in en-
tertainment law taught by Professor Richard Gordon at the Georgetown University Law
Center.
1. RESEARCH & FORECASTS, THE MILER LrrE REPORT ON AMERIcAN ATITUDES TowA.i
SPORTS (1983). Nearly seventy percent of the 1300 people polled in this survey watched,
discussed, or read about sports every day.
2. See generally Note, The Sports Court: A Private System To Deter Violence in
Professional Sports, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1982) (hereinafter The Sports Court]; Kir-
shenbaum, It's Time To Stop the Hooliganism, SPORTS ILLusTRATED 9 (Mar. 9, 1981); Com-
ment, A Proposed Legislative Solution to the Problem of Violent Acts by Participants Dur-
ing Professional Sporting Events: The Sports Violence Act of 1980, 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 91
(1981); Williams, Football Hooliganism: Offenses, Assists and Violence - A Critical Note,
7 BRrr. J. L. & Soc. 104 (1980); Beumler, Liability in Professional Sports: An Alternative
to Violence?, 22 ARIz. L. REv. 919 (1980); Note, Sports Violence: A Matter of Societal Con-
cern, 55 NOTRE DAMS LAW. 796 (1980); Swift, A Reminder of What We Can Be, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED 30 (Dec. 22, 1980); 19 DuQ. L. RFv. 191 (1980); D. ATYo, BLOOD & GuTs:
VIOLENCE IN SPORTS (1979); Comment, Controlling Violence in Professional Sports, 2 GLEN-
DALE L. REv. 323 (1978); Note, Torts in Sports - Deterring Violence in Professional Ath-
letics, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 764 (1980); Note, Consent in Criminal Law: Violence in Sports,
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tators have characterized the level of physical contact in some
sports as brutal and unnecessary for the accomplishment of effec-
tive play.3 The costs associated with violent play are borne by
players, teams, and ultimately by ticket-purchasing fans them-
selves. It is believed that even a marginal reduction of unnecessa-
rily violent play would eliminate a significant portion of sports re-
lated injuries and, hence, the costs associated with those injuries.
A profusion of commentary from a variety of disciplines has
arisen over the question of the need to control players' behavior in
the heat of competition." In this, the age of the sports revolution,
sociologists,8 psychologists,6 and lawyers7 have conducted studies
on the causes of sports violence and on the effect of that repetitive
violence on the balance of society, and particularly on youthful as-
pirants.8 Most agree that controls are necessary to deter violent
conduct in sports, but few can agree on how best to shape them.
Federal legislators have considered proposals which include
75 MICH. L. REV. 148 (1976); Note, Tort Liability in Professional Sports: Battle in the
Sports Arena, 57 NEB. L. REV. 1128 (1978); 12 GA. L. REV. 380 (1978); Letourneau & Mon-
ganas, Violence in Sports: Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Prosecutions, 16 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 577 (1978); Hechter, The Criminal Law and Violence in Sports, 19 CRIM. L. Q.
425 (1977); Comment, The Consent Defense: Sports, Violence, and the Criminal Law, 13
AM. CRiM. L. REV. 235 (1975); Note, Criminal Law: Consent as a Defense to Criminal Bat-
tery - The Problem of Athletic Contests, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 840 (1975); Comment, Player
Control Mechanisms in Professional Team Sports, 34 U. PIrr. L. REV. 645 (1973); Note,
Violence in Professional Sports, Wis. L. REV. 771 (1975); Kennedy, Wanted: An End To
Mayhem, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 17 (Nov. 17, 1975).
3. See, e.g., R. HoRRow, SPORTS VIOLENCE: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PRIVATE LAW-
MAKING AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 1-2 (1980); Comment, The Consent Defense: Sports, Vio-
lence, and the Criminal Law, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 235 (1975); J. UNDERWOOD, THE DEATH
OF AN AMERICAN GAME: THE CRISIS IN FOOTBALL (1979).
4. Some commentators have considered, in the philosophical context, the relationship
between the role of sports as a means of socialization and its subsidiary function as an outlet
for aggression. See H. VANDERZWAAY, TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT 105-08 (1972).
5. Michael Smith, a sociologist at York University in Toronto, studied 3,000 issues of
the Toronto Globe and Mail between 1963 and 1973 finding 100 incidents of sports violence
reported, 27 of which involved spectators. Appleson, Spectator Violence: What They See Is
What They Do?, 68 A.B.A. J. 404 (1982).
6. See L. BERKOWITZ, SPORT COMPETITION AND AGGRESSION IN SPORT PSYCHOLOGY & AN
ANALYSIS OF ATHLETIC BEHAVIOR 135 (1978).
7. See supra note 2. See also R. HORROW, supra note 3; Comment, Controlling Vio-
lence In Professional Sports, 2 GLENDALE L. REV. 323 (1978); Lambert, Tort Law and Par-
ticipant Sports: The Line Between Vigor and Violence, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 211 (1978).
8. Several commentators have suggested the strong correlation in what young players
see and what they do. Horrow suggests that "the entire mentality of hockey and football
revolves around the notion that each young 'gifted athlete' is trained to believe that there is
nothing 'illegal' about fighting (or even more malicious conduct) if it is done during the




criminal sanctions for players who engage in excessive violence,9 a
notion as troublesome to apply as it is intrusive on play. Other
legislation has suggested the use of a quasi-judicial arbitration sys-
tem to resolve disputes arising from violent confrontations or other
injury-creating contacts on the playing field.10 The arbitration
board known as the "Sports Court" would actually determine fault
and award damages and thereby create a psychological and eco-
nomic disincentive to violent conduct." These two legislative mea-
sures were rejected by Congress; both failed to be reported out of
the Committee on the Judiciary. 1
Three factors are likely to be significant in the consideration of
any proposal to control sports violence. First, lawmakers must be
sufficiently convinced not only that violence is a problem in sports
but that its incidence and severity will surely increase without leg-
islatively mandated reform." Indeed, any analysis of sports vio-
lence controls is premised on the belief that a problem exists, that
violence occurs gratuitously and with frequency, and that high
levels of injury are the result. Second, in order to be viable, a pro-
posal must represent a less intrusive alternative to competing
mechanisms which control violence at an unacceptable cost. The
failure of the foregoing legislative efforts, along with the judicial
9. H.R. 2263, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 Cong. Rec. H760 (1981). The Act, introduced
into the Congress by Representative Ronald Mottl (D. Ohio), called for criminal penalties
for violent acts during games. See infra note 150.
10. H.R. 5079, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 CONG. REC. H8759 (1981). The Act, introduced
by Congressman Ronald Mottl (D. Ohio), envisions the creation of a Sports Court. The
proposal was advocated in a Note which appeared in the SOUTHERN CALIFORNA LAW REVIEW
and was also promoted by Miami Attorney Richard Horrow. The Act would have essentially
required that all major sports leagues establish an arbitration board which would be empow-
ered to impose fines upon a club and players for unnecessarily violent conduct occurring
during the course of play. Office of United States Congressman Mottl, Press Release (Nov.
20, 1981); see infra notes 156-76 and accompanying text.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 158-59.
12. Hearings had been anticipated on the "Sports Violence Arbitration Act of 1981"
but never occurred. Representative Mottl was defeated in the Congressional elections of
1982.
13. The pattern of violent conduct in sports has demonstrated that the leagues are
reluctant to assume the lead in exercising control. Commentators have suggested that league
commissioners are unwilling to impose fines or suspensions with sufficient regularity to deter
violent conduct. The Sports Court, supra note 2, at 404-05; Comment, supra note 7, at 324-
25. The leagues possess broad power to control player conduct that derives largely from the
consent of the players themselves. R. HORROW, supra note 3, at 66.
The failure of leagues to take the lead in controlling violence is evident in the words of
former pro football star Alex Karras: "A defensive lineman can do just about anything. He
can damn near haul an axe out of his jock and slash around with it before he'll be called for
anything." D. ATnvo, supra note 2, at 228. See also Note, Torts in Sports - Deterring
Violence in Professional Athletics, 48 FORDHAM L. Rav. 764, 766-70 (1980).
1983 845
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 21:843
deference accorded issues which arise in the context of professional
sports, 4 make it abundantly clear that legislators will move cau-
tiously in assuming any responsible role in the modern sports in-
dustry.'5 Third, any proposed mechanism of violence control must
strike a balance between the need for violence control and the de-
sire to have professional athletes compete in an atmosphere free of
undue apprehension over the draconian imposition of monetary or
criminal sanctions.16
With these considerations in mind, this article proposes a mech-
anism for violence control in professional athletics. After address-
ing the general problem of violence in sports, this article assesses
the traditional legal mechanisms of conduct control - tort and
criminal law - and their inability to control violent behavior in
the altered state of athletic competition. An examination then fol-
14. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (exemption of baseball from antitrust
laws is an established aberration that can only be remedied by Congress); Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (baseball is unique and has unique privileges one of
which is exemption from normal federal law); Federal Baseball Club v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (baseball exempt from regulation under the
Sherman Antitrust Law). But see Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204
(1971); Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Philadelphia World
Hockey Club, Inc. v. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
Some commentators submit that the long held belief that sports should be free of legal
intervention is being replaced by the realization that meaningful reform will only be accom-
plished by "judicial intervention." 45 U. Mo. KAN. Crr L. REv. 119 (1976).
15. One exception to legislative timidity in the area of sports legislation came on
March 30, 1972, when Senator Marlow Cook of Kentucky proposed The Federal Sports Act
of 1972. In his speech which introduced the bill, he stated:
The sports world has been beset by a series of easily identifiable problems, all of
which have resulted from the mass commercialization of sports. Until recently we
have been reluctant to admit that sports is a business, as well as a national recreation
form.
Until recently, the world of sports was always different, always sacred. However,
with the recent snowball of controversy in the sports world, the time has obviously
arrived for a new perspective in the field of sports.
S. 3445, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. Rac. 11,064 (1972). Cook's unsuccessful proposal
sought to establish a Federal Sports Commission and a Sports Advisory Council to regulate
the sports industry, promulgate rules, and impose sanctions or invoke injunctions against
violators of Commission policy. Id. at 11,064-65.
Others have advocated a sports commission at the federal or state level. See, Hallowel
& Meshbesher, Sports Violence and the Criminal Law, 13 TRiAL 27 (Jan. 1977).
16. By accepting sports, society has tacitly accepted a measure of violence which is
inevitable in vigorous competition. Efforts to control violence, accordingly, must be tem-
pered in such a way as to accord deference to society's abiding interest in aggressive play.
The intimidation of players defeats the greater interest of society in the preservation of
sports' essential qualities. In addition, players cannot, in all fairness, be held to the same
standard of care in their actions on the playing field as is expected of them for action taken
before or after the game.
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lows of the major schemes to stem sports violence that Congress
has considered. These proposals are assessed by reference to two
essential factors. First, there is a study of the actual mechanism by
which each proposal allocates responsibility for conduct deemed
unacceptable. Second, the intrusiveness of those violence control
mechanisms is gauged.
The proper identification of the varying degree of acceptable and
unacceptable conduct is significant in any discussion of sports vio-
lence. In this article, an attempt is made to define and classify con-
duct as it relates to the goals of competition through use of a
"Player Conduct Model." The model is also used to plot the rela-
tion between contemporary notions of effective play and currently
codified rules of play. In turn, the Player Conduct Model is then
employed to explore the operational deficiencies and impracticali-
ties of a quasi-judicial system of arbitration to control sports
violence.
Finally, this article makes the case for legislatively mandated
rule reform. It demonstrates that real deterrence is achieved when
the desired conduct is molded by the internal mechanisms of the
several professional sports leagues. The argument is advanced that
sanctions imposed for unacceptable conduct resulting in a competi-
tive disadvantage are the most cost-effective and efficient means of
obtaining real conduct reform. Only through the strict enforcement
of codified rules are players certain to be effectively guided by a
uniform identifiable standard of substantially less violent conduct.
Accordingly, rule reform presents the least intrusive opportunity to
regulate conduct on the playing field. By limiting the application
of the defenses of consent and assumption of the risk, rule reform
incidentally increases the effectiveness of traditional legal mecha-
nisms as a sanction of especially egregious conduct.
1 7
17. This article addresses the problem of sports violence as it arises in the major
American team sports. It will deal, at various times, with episodes of violence arising in
basketball, baseball, football, and hockey. No effort will be made to address the prospect or
need for controls in amateur or professional boxing. It might be noted, however, that in the
disparity of injury rates noted among amateurs and professionals in both boxing and hock-
ey, much can be said for the benefit of uncompromising sanctions, tight participant controls,
and strict supervision. See, The Sports Court, supra note 2, at 439-40 (violence and fighting
nearly non-existent in collegiate and international hockey).
Efforts have been made recently in professional boxing to reduce the danger of serious
injury over the course of long championship bouts. The World Boxing Council has reduced
championship fights from 15 to 12 rounds. The states of New Jersey, New York, and Ne-
vada have instituted the standing eight count, a system long used in amateur boxing to
diminish a fighter's apparent vulnerability from blows received and to allow a brief period of
recuperation. Interview with Randy Gordon, Editor, RING MAGAZINE; Announcer, USA Net-
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II. VIOLENCE IN SPORTS
A. An Overview
Many athletes are conditioned from youth that violent conduct
is an acceptable means of obtaining a competitive advantage."8
Often they are convinced that the quality of their performance is
directly proportionate to their willingness to accept and inflict
punishment.19 Coaches and managers shape the character and per-
sonalities of millions of young men and women; in this capacity
they frequently teach the young athlete to appreciate the similar-
ity between the playing field and the battle field.'0
The fortunate athlete, who upon maturity is skilled enough to be
paid for his performance, quickly grasps the relationship between
work (Mar. 4, 1983).
In Pennsylvania legislation was recently introduced in the Senate to reduce injuries and
the possibility of death in the boxing ring. The bill would provide ringside physicians
greater authority to stop fights, require an ambulance and medical equipment at every bout,
regulate the size of boxing gloves, and establish a state boxing register to tally injuries and
invoke suspensions for seriously injured fighters. S.B. 632, 167th Pa. Gen. Assem., (1983
Sess.).
18. See R. HoRRow, supra note 3, at 25-28. As will be seen, a distinction must be
developed between that play which is inherently aggressive and often injurious but under-
taken in the spirit of clean competition, and that play the design and effect of which is to
create injuries or cause intimidation among opponents to facilitate an advantage.
19. Players willing to play in pain often serve as an example to teammates and such
willingness is generally regarded as indicative of considerable courage. J. UNDERWOOD, supra
note 3, at 78-80.
The athlete discovers that aggressive play can bring about certain desired results. Con-
cern about personal injury can be a disadvantage in contact sports, and improved play re-
suits in two ways: "(1) A player may receive external rewards for behavior indicating he is
unconcerned about the possibility of injury either to himself or others. (2) A player may
learn that aggression can be strategically useful in the contest or game." J. COAKLEY, SPORT
IN SocIErY: ISSUES AND CoNTRov sims 82 (1978).
20. The coach of the 1954 Little League World Championship team has stated:
My experience in '51 and '52 formed my whole philosophy about winning in Little
League tournaments: You have to be ruthless, because the other guys are ruthless
... and you have to have kids on your team who are tough, fighters, rough and ready
kids who aren't going to take any bullshit. I didn't start out thinking that way, but
after two years in tournaments, that was my opinion.
M. RAsOVSKY, DnsTIY's DARLINGS (1974). The following shows the number of college ath-
letes per 100 participants in each sport injured significantly or who suffered a serious sports
related illness during 1977-78.
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intimidation and victory."1 Studies reveal that teams have mark-
edly improved their winning percentage through the use of intimi-
dation and seemingly unrestrained hostility.2 2 The threat of the
Sport Males Females
Wrestling 29.6 -
Football (Fall) 24.0 -





Football (Spring) 10.5 -
Cross Country 9.7 13.6
Gymnastics 9.4 29.5
Lacrosse 9.1 4.1
Indoor Track & Field 8.9 9.4
Outdoor Track & Field 8.3 4.8
Baseball 6.8 -
Swimming & Diving 2.2 2.5
Squash - 12.5
Softball - 5.2
Field Hockey - 4.1
Peterson & Smith, Sports Injury Litigation: The Role of the Lawyer on the Playing Field,
7 BARRISTER 10, 13 (Summer 1980).
21. The words of two men who were perhaps most responsible for the unrivaled suc-
cess of the Green Bay Packers football team throughout the 1960's demonstrate the empha-
sis placed upon intimidation as the key determinant of winning in professional sports. The
legendary Vince Lombardi, coach of the Packers, proclaimed that: "To play this game you
must have that fire in you and there is nothing that stokes fire like hate." J. COAKLEY, supra
note 19, at 63. Interestingly, these thoughts are echoed by Jerry Kramer, Lombardi's super-
star offensive guard with the Packers, describing his pre-game feelings of aggression:
I wish that bad feeling would go away.... I've started day dreaming about Merlin
Oisen. I see myself breaking his leg or knocking him unconscious, and then I see
myself knocking out some other guys, and then I see us scoring a touchdown and
always .... I see myself the hero.
Id. at 82 (emphasis added). See also, Kennedy, Wanted: An End to Mayhem, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED 17, 18-19 (Nov. 17, 1975). See generally J. TATUM & W. KUSHNER, THEY CALL ME
ASSASSIN (1979); D. SCHULTZ & S. FiscHLmE, THE HAMMER: CONFESSIONS OF A HOCKEv EN-
FORCER (1981).
22. Violence can be used to gain an advantage by creating apprehension or fear in
opponents during competition. Players make contact or threaten to make contact with one
another in such a way as to inhibit another player's use of skill. It has been reported, for
example, that members of the 1975 and 1976 champion Pittsburgh Steelers prided them-
selves on their ability to instill fear among opponents which intimidated them and detri-
mentally affected their play. J. COAKLEY, supra note 19, at 83.
Some hockey teams have been known to tactically use the provocation of fights as a way
to remove opponents from the rink to the penalty box. Dave Schultz of the Philadelphia
Flyers explained the logic in the following way: "It makes sense to try and take out a guy
who's more important to his team than I am to mine." Id. Conn Smithe formerly of the
Toronto Maple Leafs summed up the tactical use of violence when he stated: "If you can't
beat them in the alley, you can't beat them on the ice." Id.
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use of force, including unacceptable force, whether it is actually
used is ever present in professional athletics. Occasionally, unac-
ceptable force is used, sometimes with regularity, and sometimes
with the knowledge and encouragement of team management.
23
Such tactics frequently result in serious injury, occasionally caus-
ing permanent injury and even death. 4 The general acceptance of
extreme levels of violent play is indicative of an environment
where the infliction of disabling injuries becomes as inextricably
tied to winning as skill and agility.
25
Players become conditioned to violent behavior but not without
limits. Occasionally, a player's conduct will run so far afoul of what
is considered allowable, even under normally aggressive standards,
that the conduct invokes violent retaliation. 0 Fights are perhaps
23. See id. Cf. J. UNDERWOOD, supra note 3, at 104-14, (discussing tendency of coaches
to learn utility of intimidation from their more experienced superiors).
24. Eight football related deaths occurred in each 1977 and 1978 season. J. UNDER-
WOOD, supra note 3, at 99. Each year approximately 32 college and high school players be-
come paraplegics as a result of football related injuries. Id. at 98. An estimated 5,100 inju-
ries were suffered by players in the NFL between 1969-1974. From 1973 to 1974 serious
injuries requiring the injured party to miss two or more games increased by 25% to a record
1,638. R. HORROW, supra note 3, at 5-11.
25. The Sports Court, supra note 2, at 403. The relationship between the use of skill
and violence has been aptly stated:
Ideally, professional athletes would engage only in conduct necessary for skillful play.
If every athlete acted in this manner, injury costs would be low and player skill would
determine the outcome of sports contests. Violent play upsets this equilibrium by
allowing violent players and clubs to increase their chances of winning through injury
and intimidation. Because a winning record generally leads to increased ticket sales
and, hence, greater revenue, financial incentives exist to engage in violent conduct.
Clubs that can win through violence will have larger profits and higher player sala-
ries. In order to remain competitive, other clubs will also resort to violent conduct.
Eventually a new equilibrium will be reached in which the teams engage in equally
violent behavior and player skill again determines the outcome.
Id.
26. A recent Pittsburgh Press news story reported that in the wake of an $850,000
damage award by a Detroit jury to Red Wing forward Dennis Polonich in 1982, hockey
players had not curbed their inclination to attack each other with their sticks. Polonich's
nose had been broken by a stick wielded by Toronto Maple Leaf Will Paiement in 1978.
The verdict was heralded by many as a sure sign that sticks would be abandoned when
fights erupted. The article reported:
In the six weeks of games (exhibitions included) since that verdict was handed down,
there have been at least five stick attacks.
Hartfords' Chris Kotsopoulos and Blaine Stoughton (both against Penguin Paul
Baxter) and Edmonton's Ken Linseman were found guilty of pre-season lumberjack-
ing, while Minnesota right wing Wills Plett blasted rookie Detroit Goalie Greg Stefan
(though Stefan provoked Plett with some nasty stickwork of his own) and Los Ange-
les defenseman Jerry Korab sliced up the face of Quebec left wing Dale Hunter al-
ready during the regular season.
Pittsburgh Press, Oct. 26, 1982, C-4, col. 1.
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the most notorious example of injury-creating violent conduct.2"
As they are conditioned to accept violence, players are also con-
ditioned to accept pain.2" Indeed, pain received in the heat of com-
petition engenders many of the notions of pride, commitment, and
courage that society has historically reserved for those wounded in
combat. Under such circumstances, the glorification of pain and
suffering for the sake of victory tends to not only legitimize the use
of violence, but to label those who refrain from such conduct as
less capable performers.2 9
Events on the playing field directly affect what occurs in the
stands."0 Studies convincingly demonstrate that if violence is
27. The list of notorious brawls is endless, but some of the most notable include: the
January 1, 1980, fight between Dave Cowens, then of the Boston Celtics and Tree Rollins of
the Atlanta Hawks; the December 9, 1977, attack by Kermit Washington of the Los Angeles
Lakers on Rudy Tomjanovich of the Houston Rockets - Tomjanovich's injuries included a
broken jaw and nose, and a fractured skull, see infra note 108 and accompanying text; the
backhand wallop delivered by Charles "Booby" Clark of the Cincinnati Bengals on Dale
Hackbart of the Denver Broncos on September 16, 1973, - Hackbart suffered broken
vertabrae, muscular atrophy, and a loss of strength and reflex in his arm, see infra notes
118-19 and accompanying text; the October 28, 1979, forearm administered by Steve Luke
of the Green Bay Packers on Norm Bulaich of the Miami Dolphins - the blow split Bu-
liach's mandible (jawbone), splintered the bone around one of his eyes and ended his career;
the fight between Dave Forbes of the Boston Bruins and Henry Boucha of the Minnesota
North Stars on January 4, 1975, when Forbes used his stick and fists to fracture Boucha's
eye socket and inflict facial cuts that required dozens of stitches to close; the lumberjack
attack on September 21, 1969, by Wayne Maid of the St. Louis Blues on Ted Green of the
Boston Bruins following a punch by Green - two brain operations have left Green only
partially recovered; the fight between Juan Marichal of the San Francisco Giants and John
Roseboro of the Los Angeles Dodgers - Marichal used a baseball bat in the fight with
which he struck Roseboro in the head.
28. A strong argument to be made for adequate measures that would control the level
of player violence in general is that such measures would, in turn, reduce the need for play-
ers to engage in the self-help which manifests itself in the form of brawls. In 1977, one high
school football team in Indiana registered four broken legs and many torn ligaments and
cartilages. Noting that fifteen lettermen required major surgery, the team coach said he had
considered "moving practice to the hospital lawn." J. UNDERWOOD, supra note 3, at 94.
A report by the Consumer Product Safety Commission indicates that one out of every
two amateur football players each year can expect to be sidelined by an injury that will
require them to at least miss practice; one half of them will be out for a week or more. Id. at
98.
29. A player can be made to feel he has underperformed when he engages in a measure
of self-preservation. He has demonstrated that victory, at least for him, is not the most
critical feature of athletics, and in so conceding he is the benefactor of a low "peer-rating"
by virtue of his desire to place his own welfare above that of his teammates.
30. Appleson, supra note 5. The article highlights an incident during a soccer game in
Toronto in 1971 when 13,000 spectators invaded the playing field. The fans picked up flags,
tried to strike players, and inflicted serious injuries mostly on other fans. The melee erupted
after a goal keeper tripped his opponent. See also, L. BERKOWITZ, RooTs OF AGGRESSION: A
RE-EXAMINATION OF THE FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION HvpoTEmis (1969). Berkowitz suggests
three elements that must be present to establish the relationship between spectator and
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viewed as an acceptable response on the playing field, it will be
viewed as such by many of the spectators.31 Spectator violence is a
significant part of the problem of violence in sport.3 2 Often, vio-
lence on the playing field or in the rink literally spreads to the
stands; less often, the opposite takes place. 3 Because it is beyond
the scope of this article, the high correlation between society's ex-
posure to steady doses of violence in professional athletics and the
level of violence in society in general can only be noted as quite
significant. Notwithstanding the related debate over whether sport
is more likely the source or the outlet of man's aggressive tenden-
player violence: "(1) There must be enough of an identification with one of the sides in-
volved in the competition to provide the basis for frustration. (2) The emotional response
must be one of anger. (3) Stimulus cues for aggressive behavior must be present."
31. Coakley suggests the relationship between player conduct and spectator response:
[T]he same kinds of things that evoke the anger of the players evoke the anger of the
spectators. When the response to such situations is aggressive, it is likely to serve as a
stimulus cue for the spectators. . . . Occasionally, certain objects such as bottles,
cans, rocks, ice cubes from soft drinks, and other objects are perceived as stimulus
cues by angered fans and used as tools of aggressive behavior. . . . Usually the only
feasible response to frustration for an angered fan is to become verbally abusive
.... The exception, of course, is a clear-cut negative reaction by fans that would
have an injurious psychological impact on a player, coach, or referee. One other con-
sequence of extreme verbal aggression is that it may heighten the intensity of emo-
tional arousal of the entire crowd.
Coakley, supra note 19, at 77. See also Goldstein & Arms, Effects of Observing Athletic
Contests on Hostility, in PSYCHOLOGY OF SPORT 288 (A. Fisher ed. 1976).
32. The problem of violence among spectators is considered by many to be the most
alarming of current sports related problems.
On June 4, 1974, in Cleveland, a crowd of 23,134 turned out for the first engagement
between the Indians and the Texas Rangers since a fight in an earlier game between them
had cleared both benches. By the seventh inning the Texas manager had to close down his
bullpen for fear that one of his relief pitchers would be hit by flying beer cans and firecrack-
ers. By the ninth inning only the intervention of Indian players prevented serious injury to
the Ranger team when the batter's dugout was attacked by drunken fans.
The Governor of Ohio, on another occasion, referred to a Big Ten Minnesota-Ohio
State Game that ended in a riot as "a public mugging. Gang warfare in an athletic arena."
A riot following the Pedco Soto-Mike Quarry fight in December, 1974, resulted in major
destruction to the Felt Forum in New York. Following a title defense in Great Britain more
recently, Middleweight Champion Marvin Hagler narrowly escaped serious injury from deb-
ris-throwing spectators.
A dispute at the Roosevelt Raceway on Long Island resulted in an estimated 23,000
fans attacking the tote board, "setting fire to a sulky in the home stretch, attacking a patrol
judge inside his booth, destroying concession stands and overtuning cars in the parking lot."
J. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 427-30 (1976). See also Appleson, supra note 5.
33. See Comment, Owner Liability for Intentional Torts Committed by Professional
Athletes Against Spectators, 30 BUFFALO L. R-v. 565 (1981) (discussion of the Boston Bruin
case where 4 spectators filed a $7 million lawsuit in federal court in New York following a
Bruin-Ranger game where allegedly several members of the Boston team entered the stands
and assaulted several members of the audience).
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cies, 4 efforts to control conduct on the playing field may be a fo-
cused approach to a larger problem."
B. Causes of Sports Violence
Violence continues in sports at unacceptable levels for two prin-
cipal reasons.3 " First, the competitive advantages to be gained from
violent play outweigh the costs proximately associated with such
conduct.17 Some commentators suggest, in fact, that the disadvan-
tages associated with refraining from violent play would force
teams to be violent to survive competitively. This factor - the bal-
ancing of the advantages and costs of violent play - involves an
34. The issue of whether sports is the birthplace of aggressions or its outlet has been
the subject of a long standing debate. See J. COAKLEY, supra note 19, at 63-93. Coakley has
suggested the following dichotomy based on the contradictory interpretations:
Position A Position B
Sports decreases the incidence of Sports increases the incidence of
aggression in society aggression in society
Statement la
It provides safe and controlled
opportunities to engage in the aggressive
behavior patterns that are inherent in
our genetic structure
Statement 2a
It is a safe outlet for the aggressive
impulses that are an inevitable part of
human existence
Statement 3a
It teaches how to control aggressive
behaviour when confronted with aversive
stimuli
Statement 4a
It increases interpersonal awareness and
sensitivity, which serves to promote
friendly and meaningful relationships
Statement lb
It is structured in a way that suppresses
individuals to a point that aggression
becomes necessary to cope
Statement 2b
It generates the frustration that
ultimately seeks release in the form of
aggressive behaviour
Statement 3b
It provides models for behaviour in
which aggression is positively valued and
highly rewarded
Statement 4b
It fosters the establishment of conflicting
interpersonal and intergroup goals that
then become more important than
cooperative relationships
Id. at 64. See also H. VANDERZWAAY, supra note 4, at 180.
35. The prospect of controlling spectator violence through player conduct controls
may be among the strongest arguments for the adoption of a meaningful solution to exces-
sive violence on the playing field.
36. Dr. James Garrick, while a member of the University of Washington Sports
Medicine Department alluded to the unacceptable extent of violence in sports: "If the
United States ignored an annual epidemic striking a million and a half youngsters each
autumn, Americans would revolt. . . . More high school kids get injured every Friday night
than pros do in a year." J. UNDERWOOD, supra note 3, at 99.
37. See supra note 22.
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assessment of both the costs of violent conduct to individual play-
ers and the benefits to be derived from such play by the individual,
his team, and his league. 8 The second factor which contributes to
the present level of violence is an elaborate array of "pressures"
within the sports community which insure adherence to the preva-
lent mode of conduct.
3 9
The cost of sports violence to the individual player includes the
risk of personal injury and somewhat more remotely the risk of
economic loss. 40 At times league fines or suspensions may be im-
posed on a player for violent conduct but such sanctions are pres-
ently assessed infrequently or otherwise so ineffectually that they
more closely approximate mere inconveniences rather than true
risks of, or deterrents to violent conduct.41
The risk of personal injury either to the player engaging in vio-
lent play or the victim of his assault has been widely docu-
mented.42 A player's willingness to expose himself to the risk of
injury creating conduct results not only from the prospect of gain-
ing a competitive edge but also from the nature of the contractual
relationship between the professional player and his team owners.
The economics of associational relationships dictate that he who
has sold his source of service has less incentive to protect his ser-
38. The benefits to be derived from illegal play can involve calculated judgments. It
has been said:
[Tihe coach, responds to the rules of his game as a business executive does to the
Internal Revenue Code. He wins, not by obeying them, but by conveniently balancing
the penalties risked by each violation against a strategic advantage which might be
gained. In basketball, a deliberate foul might be committed so as to interrupt a scor-
ing drive by the team in possession, thus giving that team a chance to lead by only
one point instead of two and enabling the offending team to gain possession of the
ball on more favorable terms.
Slusker, Sport: A Philosophical Perspective, 38 L. & CoNTEMP. PROB. 129, 130 (1973).
39. See R. HoRRow, supra note 3, at 30-38. Richard Horrow, a Miami attorney, con-
ducted an exhaustive analysis of the problem by focusing on those factors which contribute
to the uncontrollable nature of sports violence. Horrow contends that:
Once the skills of violence are learned, players are pressured explicitly and implicitly
by teammates, coaches, and management to continue their violent conduct. In mod-
ern hockey, for example, players are forced to fight when challenged or risk being
branded as cowards. Violence and intimidation in excess of that permitted by the
rules of the game are becoming integral parts of strategy. Players fight because it has
become a condition of the job.
Id.
40. Actual injury and economic loss are not costs to the player who engages in violent
conduct but is never injured or sued, the risk that he may be injured or may injure someone
else is what the players consider in deciding whether to engage in violent conduct.
41. See infra notes 210-13.
42. See supra note 2; see also J. UNDERWOOD, supra note 3.
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vices and less to lose by the abuse of his services.43 Professional
athletes frequently share cost of the loss of their future services,
arising from injuries or league sanctions such as suspensions, with
team owners." This sharing reduces the financial cost to the ath-
lete associated with violent conduct. The cost of violence borne by
the individual athlete is the economic loss in the form of the value
of those sources which survive beyond the term of injury payment
available under a player contract.
45
Other costs to players besides the risk of serious injury involves
the more remote prospect of civil liability. As previously men-
tioned, and as discussed in part III, the prevailing view is that the
traditional mechanisms to control conduct have lost a significant
portion of their utility in the context of professional sports.46
Balanced against the meager costs presently associated with vio-
lent conduct are the advantages to be gained from effective use of
intimidating and otherwise violent play.'7 Violent conduct often
yields competitive success which in turn produces secondary pro-
fessional advantages for players who develop a reputation for effec-
tive play in a brutal environment. To the extent that the use of
violence and skill become extricably woven, a premium is placed
on the player who makes use of the full range of his skills in an
atmosphere of play where he is able to remain indifferent about
personal safety.48 Professional, economic, and competitive incen-
tives to exploit violent conduct, in the absence of opposing forces,
create an environment uniquely suited to the violent player.
This setting is reinforced by the pressures which insure adher-
ence to violent conduct,49 further diminishing the chances for pro-
spective reform. 50 The "pressures" to maintain the presently ac-
43. H. MANNE, THE ECONOMICS OF LEGON RELATIONSHIPS: READINGS IN THE THEORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS 572 (1975). "The labor owner can more cheaply monitor any abuse of
himself than if somehow labor-services could be provided without the labor owner observing
its mode of use or knowing what was happening. Also his incentive to abuse himself is in-
creased if he does not own himself." Id. (footnote omitted).
44. Amateur athletes may also be affected either by simply following the lead of pro-
fessional athletes in estimating the level of violence that should be employed to win, or more
similarly, by becoming parties to lucrative college scholarship awards themselves which
guarantee an education and subsistance over a fixed period of time.
45. See Lehn, Property Rights, Risk Sharing, and Player Disability in Major League
Baseball, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 343 (1982).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 67-147.
47. It might be argued that given the meager costs now exacted for the use of violence,
the advantages need only be marginal to justify its use.
48. See supra note 2.
49. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
50. R. HORROW, supra note 3, at 30-38.
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cepted levels of violence are intimately tied to traditional notions
of how professional sports are played effectively21
Accordingly, the control of violence will require the imposition of
greater costs for such conduct and a decisive adjustment of the
balance away from the advantages of violence in the competitive
setting. Such a re-adjustment will also remove the reinforcing fac-
tors which insure the continuation of current levels of violence.
C. Player Conduct: Limits of Control
1. Conduct Classification
The culpability associated with the conduct of a major league
pitcher who throws at a batter can be distinguished from either the
conduct of a hockey player who "lumber-jacks" his opponent with
his stick during a brawl or the actions of a defensive safety who
"sticks" a vulnerable offensive wide receiver head-on moments af-
ter the football has passed overhead. The effectiveness of sanctions
to control sports violence will be measured by the appropriateness
of their application to varying types of player conduct.
This article suggests the following model for the analysis of com-
petitive conduct. Any attempt to describe "violent conduct" as
those actions not required for "effective play"52 is misleading since
much "legal" play is violent and simply becomes more violent
when undertaken improperly. This model, in an attempt to avoid
such inaccuracies, breaks down playing field conduct into three
categories: that which is not proscribed or is, in other words, ac-
ceptable competitive conduct; that which is proscribed or unac-
ceptable competitive conduct; and that which is actionable (broken
down in both the criminal or civil context subject to certain de-
fenses) and might be considered unacceptable conduct.
51. See Slusker, supra note 38, at 130.
52. The Sports Court, supra note 2, at 415 & n.67.
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The proper classification of player conduct is demonstrated
when the episodes referred to previously are examined.
When Dick McAuliffe, a second baseman for the 1968 pennant
chasing Detroit Tigers, stepped into the batter's box to receive the
next pitch from White Sox ace Tommy John, he was certain that
John was throwing at him. This was dangerous business.54 Only
one season earlier, the baseball world witnessed Tony Conigliaro
receive a life-threatening injury when he was struck in the face by
a Jack Hamilton fast ball.55 McAuliffe was hit by the next pitch.
He proceeded down the baseline at the instruction of the umpire
and it appeared as though he would disregard his inclination about
John. However, McAuliffe stopped, pivoted, and lunged toward the
center of the playing field. He picked John up at the legs, turned
him over and dropped him on the grass as both benches emptied.
The fight was quickly controlled but not before John sustained a
serious injury that benched him for the remainder of the season.
McAuliffe was fined and suspended at a time when his services
were vital to the Tiger organization.
Applying the player conduct model to the McAuliffe-John inci-
dent, if John had accidentally hit McAuliffe with the pitch, his
conduct falls in zone B. The penalty is controlled by the rules of
the game because McAuliffe was awarded first base as a penalty for
John's conduct. Ignoring problems of proof, if it were established
that John intended to hit McAuliffe with the pitch, the conduct
would fall in zone C. McAuliffe's response to what he considered
an obvious attack by John falls initially within zone C3, subject to
mitigating factors and certain less untenable defenses, which might
shift the classification of the conduct to zone C1. Because McAu-
liffe's conduct is also a zone B violation (the sanctions are ejection,
fine, and suspension), it is necessary to maintain a distinction be-
tween zones B and C, proscribed and actionable conduct, for rea-
54. Baseball players have remarked on the danger of pitches thrown intentionally at
the batter. Dave Cash of the Philadelphia Phillies stated, "It's dangerous every time you
step into the batter's box. . . . Your life is on the line. You're subject to getting killed. I
hate to put it that way, but how else can you put it?" Pitcher Stan Williams of the Dodgers
felt "a certain ecstacy at the sight of a sprawled batter," and after hitting Henry Aaron on
the head with a 3 and 0 pitch, Williams reportedly remarked, "As long as I'm gonna walk
him, I might as well hit him." Don Drysdale regarded the intentional use of a pitch to hit a
batter as an appropriate method of avenging the use of a beanball on a teammate. Kram,
Their Lives Are On The Line, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 35-37 (Aug. 18, 1975) (quoted in R.
HORROW, supra note 3, at 10).
55. In fact, Conigliaro made a miraculous recovery and returned to the starting roster
of the Red Sox.
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sons which will be developed later.
An on-ice fight in a 1978 game between the Detroit Red Wings
and the Toronto Maple Leafs resulted in a confrontation between
Dennis Polonich of the Red Wings and Will Paiement of the Ma-
ple Leafs. Polonich "high-sticked" Paiement and Paiement coun-
tered by hitting Polonich across the face with his stick breaking
Polonich's nose. 6
Polonich's high-sticking and his participation in the brawl as
well as Paiement's conduct can be classified within zone C. There
can be little dispute that the actions of both Polonich and Paie-
ment were unacceptable, and while such conduct contravenes the
rules of play, only that which creates injury generally results in a
resort to traditional sanctions.57
The unfortunate meeting of Jack Tatum and Darryl Stingley has
been well documented. Stingley, a wide receiver for the New Eng-
land Patriots, was recognized for his talent of making "circus
catches," and catches made "in traffic," while virtually surrounded
by opposing players.58 Tatum was a former Ohio State All-Ameri-
can affectionately tagged "the assassin" for his aggressive play at
the free safety position. A poorly thrown pass intended for Stingley
sailed over his head. At that precise moment Stingley was throt-
tled by the head-on diving impact of Tatum's body. Stingley was
rushed to a nearby hospital where a spinal fusion was performed.
His recovery was described by John Underwood in his incisive look
at violence in football:
By November, Stingley was "medically stable," and in residence at the re-
habilitation center at Northwestern University in Chicago. He was "improv-
ing, slowly." He could sit in a chair at an eighty-degree angle for two or
three hours a day. His right arm could function at the shoulder and at the
elbow, and his left arm was "progressing." His legs were "aware of some
spasms." He was able to listen to the Patriots' games by a speaker-tele-
phone at his bedside. His teammates sent him tape-recorded messages.5*
Tatum's conduct did not violate a single game rule. It was, in the
parlance of pro football, "a clean hit." Tatum's conduct, accord-
ingly, may be classified in zone A, acceptable competitive conduct
56. See Pittsburgh Press, supra note 26. Don Lever, captain of the New Jersy Devils,
characterized Polonich as a player who "lived by the sword." "He was one of the worst
stickmen in the league, a tough little guy, a back stabber." Id.
57. This is explained by the reluctance of players to take legal action against one an-
other except in the most serious instances. See infra text accompanying notes 140-41.
58. J. UNDERWOOD, supra note 3, at 45.
59. Id. at 46.
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notwithstanding the general intent on the part of Tatum, which
many commentators have suggested, to create the extreme risk of
the harm that resulted."0 However, even if it could be demon-
strated that the harm suffered by Stingley was specifically in-
tended by Tatum, the conduct would still be classified within zone
A because by not violating the rules of play, Tatum is able to im-
pose the defense of assumption of the risk. Stingley, in effect,
could be said to assume the risk of that conduct not proscribed by
the rules of play even though the conduct at issue might otherwise
be considered tortious.6
2. Intent-Based Acts
In the interest of applying a realistic system of controls to sports
violence, it is necessary to appreciate the limited range of player
conduct subject to meaningful control. A violent act, for example,
which might otherwise be labeled accidental, as in the McAuliffe-
John incident, or the results of which might be labelled fortuitous,
like Stingley's crippling injury, becomes reprehensible where a spe-
cific intent to commit the act actually exists. Because intent is dif-
ficult to prove and, sometimes, to identify in the effusive and per-
missive environment of sports, those acts which might be classified
as involving a high degree of necessary intent are less susceptible
to meaningful control. The case of the pitcher who throws at an
opposing batter provides the classic example. The presence of spe-
cific intent in this situation transforms an accidental wild-pitch
into an instrument of criminal assault.2 Problems of proof, and
the possibility of concealment, would complicate efforts to control
the vindictive pitcher, particularly for a tribunal unschooled in the
affairs of the game. 4
60. Tatum describes his role in pro-football in a book co-authored by him entitled
They Call Me Assassin, supra note 21.
61. An argument might be made that such conduct might be actionable as a criminal
assault where it could be demonstrated that Tatum intended to specifically incapacitate
Stingley and it could be further demonstrated that he both possessed the means and the
knowhow to be substantially certain that such a result would occur. Ignoring the enormous
problems of proof, the problem of reluctant prosecutors makes the likelihood of criminal
charges quite remote. See infra III. A.
62. Specific intent to create the risk of harm that is substantially likely to result from
a particular course of conduct is distinguished from those instances where the general intent
to engage in violent conduct envisions nothing more than the carrying out of acts which
while they might lead to foreseeably injurious results are not undertaken with that object in
mind. See also 12 GA. L. REv. 380 (1978).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 70-71.
64. Notably, the proposal advocated later in this article, see infra notes 205-49 and
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Notwithstanding the above delimiting points, the fact remains
that much of the violence currently plaguing professional sports
arises from players' efforts to intimidate their opponents - intent
based acts. Efforts to contain this behavior, while perhaps lacking
the potential for effectiveness of other rule reform initiatives, are
necessary for the margin of deterrence they would exert on player
conduct in general. Furthermore, the difficulties inherent in judi-
cial or quasi-judicial determinations of intent may be largely
avoided where the finding is made by a party possessing extensive
expertise in and experience with the sport at issue and evidence
permitting a thorough study of the particular incident.
3. In The Nature of Sports
Finally, certain assumptions must accompany any inquiry into
sports violence. Perhaps foremost is the realization that in the heat
of competition, one hundred games into a sizzling, tense, and viru-
lent summer of baseball, the fight like the one between McAuliffe
and John can happen, and little can be done to stop it without
stopping baseball. Further, it must be recognized that while much
of sports' appeal lies in the public's delight with basic running,
jumping, hitting, skating, kicking, and throwing - all done with
precision and grace - so too, much of sports appeal comes from its
unrestrained qualities, the delight of its unpredictability, the ex-
ploitation of human error, and the thrill of its sheer physicalness.
Accordingly, in any attempt to control sports violence one must
bear in mind that,-in all certainty, sports violence can be elimi-
nated with the elimination of sport. Even short of such draconian
measures, certain measures aimed at merely controlling sports vio-
lence may serve to diminish the quality of competition by emascu-
lating the very attributes of sports that society has decided it en-
joys or even adores. Measures to control sports violence must be
tempered not only to preserve the essence of that which is sought
to be regulated, but also to avoid unjust or unfair punishment.
Society has condoned an enterprise that, by its very acceptance
of violence as ordinary and proper, has created a climate which
makes the identification and punishment of "unacceptable compet-
itive conduct," or "unacceptable conduct," quite difficult, and at
accompanying text, relies upon internal league officials, long involved in governance of their
sports, to render determinations as to intent. While difficulties as to proof and concealment
would continue to exist, these officials' extensive familiarity with and expertise in their
games make them far more capable of precise assessments of intent.
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times impossible. Even if unacceptable conduct can be identified,
the nature of sports will require that sanctions imposed take into
account the mitigating factors associated with heated competition.
Even if a quasi-judiciary could effectively restrict unjust or unwar-
ranted conduct by clearly identifying proscribed conduct, it is diffi-
cult to see how it would be justified in imposing the penalties on
Wilf Paiement that would be imposed on him had he clubbed Den-
nis Polonich with a board on Woodward Avenue.
Finally, sports has often been contemplated as a microcosm of
life's challenges-and frustrations.65 Like life itself, sport will never
be free of occasional aberrant behavior. A successful tempered sys-
tem of controls would render violent play in sports simply and
truly aberrant. The sensible modification of player conduct allows
those redeeming qualities of spirited competition to become more
accessible to participants and aspirants alike. The ends and means
of excellence in competitive sports must be self-control. The use of
skill and agility in team sports must continue to be reinforced by
the notion that individual sacrifices, discipline, and self-control
will promote not only individual achievement but also collective
successes. 6" A reduction in the level of violence necessarily in-
creases the reliance placed upon skill, training and, where appro-
priate, team play. The reasons why sports benefit society, in effect,
become the reasons why society should strive to rid sports of exces-
sive and unnecessary violence.
III. TRADITIONAL REMEDIES TO REDRESS INJURY DUE TO SPORTS
VIOLENCE
A. Criminal Law
The employment of the criminal law to control the conduct of
athletes in competition has been undertaken only with the greatest
reluctance. 7 Formal charges against athletes have been rare, and
successful prosecutions in the context of professional sports are
largely nonexistent.68 The perceived harshness of the criminal
65. See, e.g., Slusker, supra note 38.
66. Id.
67. See generally R. HoRRow, supra note 3; Beumler, supra note 2; Hechter, supra
note 2; Comment, supra note 3; Comment, supra note 7, at 328; Note, Criminal Law: Con-
sent as a Defense to Criminal Battery - The Problem of Athletic Contests, 28 OKLA L.
RED. 840 (1975).
68. See, e.g., State v. Forbes, No. 63280 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 4th Dist., Aug. 12, 1975)
(dismissed after mistrial); Regina v. Green, 16 D.L.R. 3d 137 (1971) (acquittal); Regina v.
Maki, 14 D.L.R. 3d 164 (1970); Regina v. Maloney, No. S-461-76 (Jud. Dist. of York, To-
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sanction has been manifested in reluctant prosecutors, equivocat-
ing courts, and sympathetic juries.69
While it is the duty of prosecutors to seek enforcement of the
criminal code which may, at times, require the prosecution of ath-
letes, it is also the duty of prosecutors to make the most effective
use of their limited resources. Public officials would be hard
pressed to justify the expenditure of large sums to prosecute inci-
dents of violence among consenting adults in an environment that
has historically condoned violence and abusive conduct.70 The very
limited resources currently available for the prevention, detection,
and prosecution of urban crime, and the paltry funds available for
criminal correction and rehabilitation, strongly suggest that other
mechanisms be employed to battle whatever criminal conduct
arises in the context of sports.7 1 There may be instances, however,
when the wrong committed by an athlete in the form of an assault
on another player is so egregious, and so violative of the public
good, that a criminal prosecution is appropriate and necessary.
Prosecutors in Minnesota, New York, and Canada have sought
convictions against athletes for allegedly illegal behavior during
athletic contests.72 All three prosecutions were based upon charges
of assault and battery. The ineffectiveness of formal criminal
charges in the control of sports violence is readily apparent from a
review of these cases.
One successful prosecution of an athlete for his conduct on the
playing field came in People v. Freer7 3 against a young New York
amateur athlete. John Freer was punched in the throat during a
tackle. After the play, he, in turn, punched the party he believed to
be responsible for the earlier blow. The player Freer punched re-
ceived serious injury to his eye requiring plastic surgery. Charges
were lodged against Freer for assault and battery and he was found
guilty by a court which concluded that Freer's actions were unwar-
ranted and not in self-defense because he had no reason to fear
ronto Crim. Ct., acquitted June 30, 1976). Horrow reports that between 1969-1980 close to
100 convictions had been secured on the amateur level. See R HORROW, supra note 3, at
161-62.
69. See, e.g., Beumler, supra note 2, at 926.
70. Of course, consent is generally no defense to a criminal charge, where what is
sought to be redressed is a public wrong, except for those crimes where lack of consent is a
necessary element.
71. See generally RAMSEY CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA (1970). See also infra V. & VI.
72. See supra note 68; People v. Freer, 86 Misc. 2d 280, 381 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1976).
73. 86 Misc. 2d 280, 381 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1976).
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any continued attack by the injured player."4
On January 4, 1975, during a hockey game in Bloomington, Min-
nesota, Henry Boucha of the Minnesota North Stars and Dave
Forbes of the Boston Bruins were simultaneously released from
their respective penalty boxes during a time out. Earlier, they had
each been assessed seven minutes for fighting. Forbes immediately
attacked Boucha with his fists and stick. After Boucha fell to the
ice, Forbes proceeded to pummel him and pound his head into the
surface until other players intervened.
A grand jury -sitting in Hennepen County, Minnesota, indicted
Forbes for aggravated assault. This was the first criminal prosecu-
tion in the United States of a professional athlete for culpable be-
havior as a participant in a professional athletic contest.7 The jury
in the case was unable to reach a verdict, and the case was not
retried. 6
A fight between Wayne Maki of the St. Louis Blues and Ted
Green of the Boston Bruins in September, 1969, at Ottawa, Ca-
nada resulted in Canadian prosecutions against both combatants;
neither prosecution resulted in a conviction.7 The fight began with
Green striking Maki in the face with a gloved hand and ended with
Maki using his stick to fracture Green's skull.
The court which heard the evidence in Regina v. Maki,7' deter-
mined that Maki may have reacted in self-defense to the original
attack by Green and that the evidence did not demonstrate that
Maki had used excessive force in defending himself. Maki was ac-
quitted on the basis of self-defense; the court found the consent
defense inapplicable. The court declared in dicta that "no athlete
should be presumed to accept malicious, unprovoked, or overly vio-
lent attack.
'7 9
In Regina v. Green,80 the court acquitted Green on a theory of
implied consent. The court considered the act of striking with the
gloved fist a normal occurrence in hockey which should not be con-
sidered an assault. The court also found elements of self-defense in
74. When assault and battery are used in conjunction they generally refer to battery
itself. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 80 at 603 (1972).
75. State v. Forbes, No. 63280 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 4th Dist., Aug. 12, 1975).
76. The prosecutor apparently was satisfied that he had sent a message to the sports
community that excessive violence could not be tolerated. Beumler, supra note 2, at 925.
77. Regina v. Green, 16 D.L.R. 3d 137 (1971); Regina v. Maki, 14 D.L.R. 3d 164 (1970).
78. 14 D.L.R. 3d 164 (1970).
79. Regina v. Maki, 14 D.L.R. 3d at 167.
80. 16 D.L.R. 3d 137 (1971).
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some of Green's other actions."1
The Maki and Green cases indicated there was a limit to the
level of violence a court would be willing to place within the ambit
of the consent defense. The court in Green noted that convictions
could result under the proper circumstances where the cloud of
self-defense present in the foregoing cases was not present.
8 2
Violence of comparable severity in the context of professional
football has gone relatively unnoticed by prosecutors.8 3
Besides the problems of general reluctance in employing the
criminal process to control player conduct, commentators have
suggested constitutional barriers to such enforcement where the
conduct allegedly considered criminal is vaguely defined so that
proper notice to potential violators is lacking. 4
B. Tort Law
In theory, violence of the type found in professional sports can
be redressed through the use of traditional tort law remedies. The
three basic elements necessary to form a cause of action in tort -
an act, causation, and some degree of intent to act - are generally
found in acts of violence which occur in professional sports.85 In-
deed, on first blush, tort recovery appears to be an effective means
of controlling sports violence. By exacting a financial penalty on
unacceptable conduct, tort law hits the professional athlete where
it hurts the most: the paycheck.86 The utility of the tort remedy
and, specifically, its use as a deterrent to violence, is substantially
limited, however, by the operation of a number of substantive de-
fenses and of other procedural and practical factors. This article
examines, in part 1 below, the availability of traditional tort reme-
dies by reviewing the possible theories upon which a professional
athlete might seek to redress injuries he incurs due to the exces-
sively violent behavior of an opponent. Stressed in particular is the
81. Beumler, supra note 3, at 924.
82. 16 D.L.R. 3d at 142-43 (1971).
83. See J. UNDERWOOD, supra note 3, at 43-44.
84. See Comment, supra note 7, at 329-31. This article discusses the vagueness doc-
trine and asserts that the due process protections of the 5th and 14th amendments require
certainty in criminal sanctions and concludes that this may be unattainable when general
criminal statutes are applied to the conduct of athletes.
85. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (4th ed. 1971). See also
infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing the particular importance of the intent
element in the sports violence setting).
86. See infra text accompanying note 200 (discussion of importance of money as moti-
vational factor for professional athletes).
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manner in which the defenses of consent and assumption of the
risk broadly delimit recovery. The article outlines, in part 2 other
factors which further restrict recovery.
1. Tort Theories of Recovery
All forms of sports violence entail harmful contacts resulting
from acts by one athlete against another.8 7 The element which de-
termines an act's degree of tortiousness is the mental state attend-
ing the behavior. Where one player inflicts intentional harm on an-
other, i.e., by starting a fight, the injured player may sue for
battery.88 Distinct from the intentional tort of battery, recklessness
involves a choice of a course of action with knowledge and appreci-
ation that such behavior entails a risk that a reasonable man would
avoid.89 Unlike the battery situation, the reckless tortfeasor does
not intend a specific harm to follow from his act.90 Negligence, a
course of conduct involving still lesser culpability, is not the type
of volitional, focused action characterizing both battery and reck-
lessness. Negligence consists of "mere inadvertence, lack of skill-
fulness or failure to take precautions,"9 1 signifying the failure of an
actor to conform to the standard of behavior necessary to protect
others from unreasonable risks arising from the actor's conduct.'
This scheme indicates the importance of the intent component
to a classification of tort remedies for injury-causing conduct. In
the context of professional sports such a determination is pro-
foundly complicated"s because sports, by their nature, involve ag-
87. This assessment encompases direct injury, see, e.g., Hackbart v. Cincinnati Ben-
gals, 601 F.2d 516, 519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979) (one football player
used his forearm to strike opposing player in the back of the head in an action totally re-
moved from the course of the game), as well as indirect injury in which the injury is caused
by a force set in motion by the defendant, for example, where one football player shoves an
opponent into a stationary object such as the goal post.
88. See W. PROSSER, supra note 85, at § 9; Lambert, Tort Law and Participant
Sports: The Line Between Vigor and Violence, 4 J. CoNTEMP. L. 211, 212 (1978).
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965), set forth infra text accompany-
ing note 117. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 8 at 32.
90. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965); De Moth, A Compari-
son of the Conduct Required in Trespass to Chattels and Negligence, 33 RocKY MTN. L.
REV. 323 (1961).
91. See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, 601 F.2d 516, 524 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 931 (1979).
92. See W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 30 at 143-45 (outlining the elements necessary to
make out a cause of action for negligence). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281
(1965).
93. See infra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (pointing to the difficulty of this
intent determination as key reason why internal league rulemaking is a particularly appro-
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gressive physical contact. 4 Thus, whereas a normal battery action
protects one's interest in the integrity of one's person and things
connected with it, a battery action for injuries arising in the pro-
fessional sports milieu must account for touching permitted by the
rules of the various games, a concept developed more fully in the
forthcoming discussions of the consent and assumption of the risk
defenses.1s Under a normal tort analysis, some references to the
nature of the act undertaken may well inform the factfinder as to
the likely mental state of the actor." The physically-intensive en-
vironment of professional sports makes similar deductions impossi-
ble and the mental state determination much more difficult.
9 7
a. Battery: Recovery Under Intentional Tort Theories
Intentional wrongdoing presents perhaps the simplest problem
under tort law. 8 A person acts in a way that causes a result which
the person intended. Where that result consists of an invasion of
the bodily integrity of another, an intentional tort, a battery, has
occurred." It should be stressed that intentional torts are acts
which create or disclose dangers which have a substantial cer-
tainty of producing a specifically foreseeable harm.100
In the case of professional sports, the operation of the consent
defense and the difficulty of the intent question substantially ob-
structs most avenues of recovery under intentional tort law theory.
While the elements of a cause of action for battery may be estab-
priate mechanism by which to regulate violence in professional sports; being occupationally
employed as governors of their respective sports, the leagues have expertise and exposure
enabling them to most ably determine mental attitude of players).
94. Cf. infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (discussing effect of consent defense
on tort analysis in the professional sports context).
95. See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
96. This is not to suggest, however, that such an inquiry will be at all determinative.
One may directly inflict very serious physical injury and still be liable only for negligence.
See, e.g., Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969) (doctor held liable for negli-
gence for leaving sponge in plaintiff-patient's body for 23 years).
97. See infra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (proposal citing difficulty of this
type of factual determination as a major reason to defer to the leagues for violence controls;
leagues' expertise and regular exposure to their sports makes them much more able to capa-
bly resolve these questions and so to regulate violence in their sports).
98. Lambert, supra note 7, at 212.
99. See Note, Violence in Professional Sports, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 771, 774-75 (outlin-
ing requirements for intentional tort action); see also, W. PROSSER, supra note 85, at §§ 8-9.
100. See W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 8 at 32 & § 9 at 35-36; Hackbart v. Cincinnati
Bengals, 601 F.2d 516, 524-25 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979) (court analyzing
civil case for excessive violence in professional football game, distinguishes intentional tort
of battery from recklessness).
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lished with relative ease,1"' the consent defense may often be suc-
cessfully interposed, given the permissive nature surrounding a
broad range of conduct in professional sports.1
02
The defense of consent blocks a tort action brought by a player
who "manifests a willingness to submit to such bodily contacts or
restrictions of liberty as are permitted by [a sport's] rules or us-
ages."'01 3 This formula, adopted by courts in several cases, 04 is ad-
vanced in the commentary for Restatement (Second) of Torts sec-
tion on the consent defense. Section 50, comment b provides:
Taking part in a game. Taking part in a game manifests a willingness to
submit to such bodily contacts or restrictions of liberty as are permitted by
its rules or usages. Participating in such a game does not manifest consent
to contacts which are prohibited by rules or usages of the game if such rules
or usages are designed to protect the participants and not merely to secure
the better playing of the game as a test of skill. This is true although the
player knows that those with or against whom he is playing are habitual
violators of such rules.'
0 5
The use of the phrase "rules or usages" suggests that the ambit of
a player's consent extends beyond that touching permitted by the
rules of play.'0 6 Reference to the remainder of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts commentary to § 50 partially clarifies the word
"usages" by asserting that participation in a game does not mani-
fest consent to contacts prohibited by the game's safety rules as
101. Again, the notion of intent will probably be as important here as it is in most
other situations. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of the
intent determination).
102. The word "routine" is used here so as to encompass violent contact mandated by
the rules of the various games as well as that touching which is customary and thus tacitly
approved. The former category would involve contact such as blocking in football, checking
in hockey and a base runner sliding into the second basemen who is trying to turn a double
play in baseball. The latter group, on the other hand, would include the elbows and shoving
typical to a professional basketball game. See also Lambert, supra note 7, at 212 (discussing
shift to consent defense in tort analysis of professional sports violence).
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50, comment b (1965).
104. See, e.g., Tavernier v. Maes, 242 Cal. App. 2d 532, 51 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1966); Dud-
ley v. William Penn College, 219 N.W.2d 484 (Iowa 1974); Perkins v. Byrnes, 364 Mo. 849,
269 S.W.2d 52 (1954); Schamel v. St. Louis Arena Corp., 324 S.W.2d 375 (Mo. App. 1959);
McGee v. Board of Education, 16 A.D.2d 99, 226 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1962); Gordon v. Deer Park
School Dist. No. 414, 71 Wash. 2d 119, 426 P.2d 824 (1967).
105. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 50, comment b (1965).
106. Cf. Stewart v. D&R Welding Supply Co., 51 111. App. 3d 597, 366 N.E.2d 1107
(1977) (holding that participation in sport only manifested consent to foreseeable unpros-
cribed touching). But see Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31111. App. 2d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975) (in
case of injury arising out of a high school soccer match, consent held to extend only to
conduct within the rules of play).
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distinguished from rules designed to enhance the quality of play. 07
What is not expressly addressed is whether the inverse implication
of the comment is intended to hold sway: whether by his participa-
tion a player is to be understood as consenting to all infractions of
non-safety-oriented rules. If this is the interpretation intended,
even the most violent contacts would be shielded from legal liabil-
ity so long as they: (1) result from actions which are sufficiently
related to the game to be considered one of its "usages;" and (2)
are not infractions of the game's safety rules. Under this analysis,
the only clearly actionable conduct is that which is so extreme as
to be totally unrelated to play, i.e., fighting.108
b. Recklessness
The conduct to which the intentional tort remedy applies, al-
though common in professional athletics, is not the dominant be-
havior characterizing most sports violence.1 09 While athletes tend
to resort to violence as a means of gaining a competitive edge
through competition, with a primary aim to gaining an edge over
opponents via intimidation,1 0 the absence of the specific intent to
cause injury in most episodes of sports violence, precludes recovery
in intentional tort.'11 The mental state attending the more com-
mon behavior, however, is far more deliberate than the careless-
ness characterizing negligence.1 2 Consequently, courts deal with
this sort of sports violence by applying a hybrid standard of liabil-
107. See supra text accompanying note 105.
108. See, e.g., Tomjanovich v. California Sports, Inc., No. H-78-243 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17,
1979). In Tomianovich, Rudy Tomjanovich, a star forward on the Houston Rockets basket-
ball club, and his team received a $3.25 million judgment against California Sports, Inc.,
owner of the Los Angeles Lakers. The action arose out of an incident during a 1977 Rockets-
Lakers game in which Kermit Washington of the Lakers punched Tomjanovich in the face.
The blow caused severe fractures and soft tissue damage to the maxillofacial area, requiring
extensive treatment and sidelining Tomjanovich for an extensive portion of the season.
109. Of particular note in this regard is professional hockey, where fighting has be-
come commonplace. And, in the relatively contact free world of professional baseball, fight-
ing is also of some concern. Occurring with far lesser frequency than in hockey, fighting in
the baseball context often involves whole teams squaring off against one another in tremen-
dous melees. Because baseball players, unlike their hockey and football counterparts, wear
little protective gear, the probability of injury in these brawls is probably far greater than in
fights in other sports.
110. See infra notes 213-18, 231-39 and accompanying text (discussing the need for
role reform to redress the tendency of professional athletes to try to gain an advantage in
sports contests by violent intimidation of opponents).
111. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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ity: willful and wanton misconduct or recklessness. "
In describing the mental state of "quasi intent""' involved in
recklessness, Dean Prosser asserts that while one who acts reck-
lessly does not actually intend to do harm, his is "so far from a
proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if it
were so intended." 115 Prosser adds that the reckless tortfeasor is
one who has "proceeded in disregard of a high degree of danger,
either known to him or apparent to a reasonable man in his posi-
tion." 1 Closely tracking Prosser's assessment of recklessness, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts expresses the recklessness concept
from the perspective of one's duty to an innocent third party:
Reckless Disregard of Safety Defined
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if
he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to
the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which
would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct cre-
ates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that
such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make
his conduct negligent.
1 1 7
The Tenth Circuit, in Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.,'"
reversed a district court decision and held that tort law principles
were not inapplicable merely because an injury took place during a
game.
In a 1973 contest with the Denver Broncos, the Cincinnati Ben-
gals had possession of the ball in Bronco territory and were driving
toward the goal line. The drive stalled, however, when a Bengal
pass toward the right side of the Bronco end zone was intercepted
by a Bronco linebacker, Billy Thompson, who returned the ball to
mid-field. The intended receiver on the play, a Bengal running
back named Charles "Booby" Clark, had been covered by a Bronco
free safety, Dale Hackbart. As a consequence of the interception,
the roles of Clark and Hackbart suddenly switched; Hackbart be-
113. See W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 34 at 184; Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, 601
F.2d 516, 524 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979) (recklessness standard applied to
professional football injury). It is noteworthy that some courts have applied this standard to
other sports related injuries, where amateurs' overzealousness has led to excessive violence.
See, e.g., Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill. App. 3d at 212, 334 N.E.2d at 258 (1975) (recklessness
applied standard to schoolyard soccer injury).
114. See Eliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 S. CAL. L. REv. 91, 143 (1932).
115. W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 34 at 184.
116. Id. at 185. See Brittan v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970).
117. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 500 (1965).
118. 435 F. Supp. at 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 931 (1979).
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came an offensive player and Clark a defender. In his new capac-
ity, Hackbart threw his body before Clark's in an effort to block
him. Thereafter, Hackbart remained on the ground, watching the
remainder of the play on one knee. The trial court found that
Clark, "[a]cting out of anger and frustration, but without a specific
intent to injure . . . stepped forward and struck a blow with his
right forearm to the back of the kneeling plaintiff's head and neck
with sufficient force to cause both players to fall forward to the
ground."11 9 Because the officials failed to view this incident, they
failed to call a penalty.
The district court determined that the plaintiff had assumed the
risk of such an injury. ' The appellate court reversed and held
that, as a general proposition, the assumption of the risk doctrine
does not necessarily extend to professional football players seeking
redress for allegedly reckless behavior of opposing players and that
the plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action under Colorado
law.1 2' To reach this decision, the court applied § 500 of the Re-
statement and concluded that "recklessness exists where a person
knows that the act is harmful but fails to realize that it will pro-
duce the extreme harm which it did [sic] produce. It is in this re-
spect that recklessness and intentional conduct differ in degree.'9
22
On first analysis, the use of a recklessness standard to judge lia-
bility for violence in professional athletics is intuitively appealing.
The deliberate, yet unfocused aggression characterizing most ath-
letic violence lacks the specificity required by intentional torts but
is more volitional than negligent behavior. Recklessness, however,
aptly blends an intent to act with an absence of intent to cause a
particular harm where there is a strong likelihood of harm. But
further review evinces weaknesses with even this standard. Liabil-
ity for recklessness, for example, does little to redress sports vio-
lence not proscribed by a game's safety rules. Conduct permitted
by the structure of the rules of play invariably leads to the imposi-
119. 435 F. Supp. at 353 (emphasis added).
120. 435 F. Supp. at 358.
121. 601 F.2d at 524.
122. Id. It should be pointed out that this juxtaposition of recklessness to intentional
and negligent tortious conduct differs from that forwarded by Prosser. Prosser maintains
that recklessness is an "aggravated form of negligence differing in quality.., from ordinary
lack of care. . . . [Recklessness is] conduct which is still merely negligent, rather than actu-
ally intended to do harm .. " W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 34 at 184. Whatever the
precise location of recklessness on the negligence - intentional tort continuum, the reck-
lessness standard certainly appears a more appropriate gauge of liability for violence in the
professional athletic sphere than the standards at the two extremes.
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tion of the consent defense to thwart recovery. This anamoly rein-
forces the position that the sports violence problem requires inter-
nal adjustments12 rather than judicial intervention.' 2 "
The operation of the consent defense may be traced to the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 50, comment b which applies the
consent defense to sports. As noted earlier with respect to consent
in intentional torts cases, the commentary limits the defense to
contacts not prohibited by the game's safety provisions.125 This
notwithstanding, the Restatement provision does assert without
qualification that a sports participant consents to physical touch-
ing permitted by the game's "usages.', 2 6 Consequently, the defense
may well forestall any action for recklessness which is not grossly
inconsistent with normal play. This begs the question of who is to
deal with the excessive violence inherent in "normal play.'
27
The doctrine of assumption of the risk is generally recognized to
have a narrower scope than the consent defense; one will be taken
to have assumed only those risks which are obvious and foresee-
123. This term refers to the established institutions whose single expressed purpose is
to govern and shape the several professional sports, i.e., the leagues.
124. See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. at 357-58 (court opts for
self-regulation and legislation, rather than tort laws, as solution to problem of excessive
violence in pro football); Lambert, supra note 7, at 216-17 (commentator opts for strict
enforcement rules and legislation as more promising violence control mechanisms than tort
law).
125. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text (discussing application of consent
defense in intentional tort cases).
126. RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF TORTS § 50, comment b (1965).
127. One tragic example of just this sort of permitted behavior is the case of Darryl
Stingley. In a National Football League game between Stingley's New England Patriots and
the Oakland Raiders, Stingley, a wide receiver, was being covered by Jack Tatum, a defen-
sive back with the Raiders. Although the pass to Stingley was overthrown and clearly in-
complete, Tatum hit Stingley with a devastating head-on blow. Apparently Tatum's objec-
tive was to intimidate his opponent. The result, however, far exceeded mere psychological
trepidation of the Patriot receiver - Tatum's unnecessary brutality rendered Stingley a
quadriplegic.
Most noteworthy perhaps is the fact that Tatum's behavior was not even penalized nor
was a civil action brought. Indeed, the hit was arguably a normal incident of play - a
"usage" - by NFL defensive backs. In many instances, players in the defensive secondary
are not able to tell whether a receiver will catch a pass and are "forced," therefore, to hit
even those receivers who do not make receptions. The difference between this situation and
the Stingley-Tatum incident is that in the latter, the ball was clearly out of Stingley's grasp,
obviating the necessity for the contact. A penalty was not called because the response by
Tatum was similar to that seen in normal competitive play. It is essential to add that this
does not mean that Tatum's aggression was justifiable or undeterrable. The incident raises
the need for these problems to be dealt with by the league itself, for it is the body in the
best position to assess the occurrence, and most especially the probable mental state with
which Tatum executed his deed. To the extent it involved any form of intimidation, it
should be strictly outlawed.
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able. 28 Thus, to assume a risk, a participant in a given game must
have been able to point to a particular danger that he chose to
accept. 12 9 There exists substantial division among courts and com-
mentators, however, as to whether sports participants can assume
the risk of reckless conduct, for such conduct is rarely foresee-
able.8 0 Indeed, for this reason a number of jurisdictions have elim-
inated the assumption of the risk doctrine in all but those cases
where the plaintiff expressly agrees to assume a given risk. "'
Where implied risk assumption has been abolished, the limits of
liability are those set by the consent defense - i.e., conduct per-
mitted by the rules and usages of the game.3 2
c. Negligence
According to the authors of the Restatement, negligence consists
of a failure to use ordinary care to avoid injury to others and in-
volve a mental state characterized by mere inadvertence, lack of
128. See Note, Injuries Resulting from Nonintentional Acts in Organized Contact
Sports: The Theories of Recovery Available to the Injured Athlete, 12 IND. L. REv. 687, 696
(1979); W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 68 at 447-50 (detailed discussion of "knowledge of the
risk" element of assumption of the risk). Dean Prosser proclaims that "[k]nowledge of the
risk is the watchword of assumption of the risk." Elaborating, Prosser writes that the plain-
tiff must comprehend and appreciate the particular danger and that although the injury is
theoretically a subjective one, a plaintiff will not be heard to say that he did not compre-
hend a risk which must have been clear and obvious to him." Id. at 447-48.
129. Cf. McGee v. Board of Education, 16 A.D.2d 99, 226 N.Y.S.2d 329 (1962) (player
in amateur sporting event held to have assumed risks of injury normally associated with the
sport); Bourque v. Duplechin, 331 So. 2d 40 (La. App. 1976) (amateur athletic contestant
held not to assume risks caused by recklessness of others). But cf. Hackbart v. Cincinnati
Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977) 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 931 (1979) (level of violence typical to N.F.L. led court to hold as a matter of law that
player assumed risk of injury from blow delivered emotionally but without specific intent to
injure).
130. Id. See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, LAW OF TORTS, 1162-92 (1956); James,
Assumption of the Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968); Chamption &
Swygert, Nonprofessional Sport-Related Injuries and Assumption of Risk in Pennsylvania:
Is There Life After Rutler?, 54 PA. BAR A.Q. 34 (1983).
131. See, e.g., Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. 1967); Feigner v. Anderson, 375
Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136 (1965); Bolduc v. Crain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d 641 (1962); Mc-
Grath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238 (1963) (assumption of risk no
longer recognized as a distinct doctrine). Cf. Barret v. Fritz, 42 IMI. 2d 555, 248 N.E.2d 111
(1969) (court all but eviscerated assumption of risk doctrine under Illinois law). See W.
PROSSER, supra note 85, § 68 at 454-57 (general discussion of trend towards abolition of risk
assumption defense).
132. See Lambert, supra note 7, at 216; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 50, com-
ment b (1965); supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (limits of liability for recklessness
in light of consent defense).
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skillfulness or failure to take precautions. 33 There is disagreement
among the courts as to the applicability of mere negligence in the
sports setting. Some courts have ruled that an action for negligence
would lie where a sports participant shirks ordinary care for the
safety of others on the playing field. 34 Other tribunals, however,
have required greater negligence.' 3 5
While there appears to be little reason to limit liability to more
aggravated forms of negligence, the dispute over the availability of
a negligence remedy for allegedly tortious behavior in the sports
setting is of little consequence to this article. By definition, merely
negligent acts involve a careless inadvertence devoid of the deliber-
ate, volitional behavior which give rise to actions for recklessness
and intentional tort. The upshot of this is that negligent behavior
is far less deterrable, and thus less troublesome. The main regard
of this article is the conscious, concerted regimen of brutality
found in many of America's most popular sports.
2. Additional Factors Which Further Restrict Recovery
a. Other Plausible Defenses
The defenses of consent and assumption of the risk are not the
only defenses which operate to limit recovery in tort. Self-de-
fense,3 6 provocation, 7 mutual combat, 38 privilege, mistake and
133. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
134. See, e.g., Niemczyk v. Burleson, 538 S.W.2d 737, 741-42 (Mo. 1976) (held base
runner in amateur baseball game negligent for colliding with shortstop as runner attempted
to run from first base to second). Cf. Mann v. Nutrulite, Inc., 136 Cal. 2d 729, 289 P.2d 282 -
(1955) (ball which hit plaintiff in head during girl's softball game held not negligently
thrown, although court recognized in dicta possibility of negligence in different situation);
Page v. Unterreiner, 106 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. 1937) (court held hooked golf drive not negligent
but failed to rule out possibility of negligence under other circumstances).
135. Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill. App. 3d 212, 234 N.E.2d 258 (1975) (under vaguely
termed standard, court imposes liability under what appears to be a recklessness standard,
where amateur baseball runner attempted to break up double play by galloping full speed
into second baseman stationed at least four feet wide of second); Bourque v. Duplechin, 331
So. 2d 40 (La. App. 1976) (court required showing of recklessness for injury in schoolyard
soccer match).
136. The defense was successfully employed in a criminal prosecution arising out of
the 1970 N.H.L. stick swinging incident between Wayne Maki and Ted Green. Cf. Haeussler
v. De Loretto, 109 Cal. App. 2d 363, 240 P.2d 654 (1952) (successful use of self-defense for
civil battery case rising in non-sports context).
137. See, e.g., Chapman v. Lamp, 189 Iowa 771, 179 N.W. 50 (1920) (though no bar to
recovery, provocation may mitigate remedy). Because provocation may operate to mitigate a
remedy, it is of particular utility in the intentional tort area where remedies may include
punitive damages. See W. PROSSER, supra note 85, § 9 at 35.
138. In situations of mutual combat, both parties are held liable for public policy rea-
874
Sports Violence
defense of others are all available, some having actually been suc-
cessfully raised. The limits on self-defense demonstrate the diffi-
culties with these, however. Self-defense requires the defendant to
restrict his retaliation to a level roughly equal to the force con-
fronting him. Most states add some form of retreat requirement to
this defense, often making the defense available only where retreat
is unreasonable.13 9
b. Reluctant Plaintiffs
The foregoing analysis reveals the constraints on recovery inher-
ent in the tort system and thus the limited utility of that system as
a deterrent to professional sports violence. The greatest obstacle to
the civil suit, however, is a factor which represents an aversion to,
rather than an out-growth of, the legal process. Professional ath-
letes in all sports are reluctant to resort to civil litigation."1 0
Human and business interrelationships produce great pressure on
players to eschew remedies beyond those set-up by the leagues. " '
In bringing suit, athletes risk ostracism and, particularly with con-
tact sports, physical retaliation by opponents and teammates as
well. Perhaps more importantly, players initiating suit face the
possibility of unpleasant attempts by management - e.g., wage
manipulation and threats of being traded - to discourage such
dispute resolution. Unlike most litigants, professional athletes and
their teams operate in closed, highly interdependent societies; after
a tort suit is litigated to judgment, the plaintiff-athlete must re-
turn to that world (unless of course he had retired in the interim).
c. Multiple Jurisdictions
The usefulness of the common-law based tort law to deter sports
violence is also undermined by the lack of notice players have as to
standards by which their behavior is to be judged. Because profes-
sional athletes perform in many different jurisdictions, their play
sons. See Annot., 6 A.L.R. 388 (1920). Often mutual combat is deemed by statute a public
breach of the peace, and hence unlawful. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1970 &
Supp. 1982).
139. See W. PROSSEE, supra note 85, § 19.
140. See, e.g., Schmidt, In Football, It's Arbitration, TRLuL, June 1978, at 38 (NFL
administrator estimates that prior to 1978 only 10 civil suits where professional football
players sued their own teams to redress injuries).
141. For example, the NFL has a player's union arbitration procedure for injury griev-
ance. Id. See also R. HoaRow, supra note 3, at 46-58. Comment, Controlling Violence in
Professional Sports, 2 GLENDALE L. REv. 323, 327 (1978).
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has to conform to the varying legal standards of care of those juris-
dictions. To the extent the athlete is prevented from referring to a
single clear standard, he is less likely to conform consciously to any
single norm.
d. The Essential Inadequacy of the Tort-Based Deterrent in the
Professional Sports Milieu
The fundamental problem underlying the phenomenon of vio-
lence in professional athletics is the trend in many sports toward
adoption of excessive violence as an accepted "usage" of the sev-
eral games.142 Tort suits represent post hoc relief and as such will
not quell the excess violence of pro sports. The tort law provides a
remedy for invasions ranging from the most negligible touching,
warranting only nominal damages, to wrongful death. When ap-
plied to a milieu where hard contact is permitted and often re-
quired, however, it is only extreme contact, distinguishable from
the surrounding "consensual" touching, which gives rise to litiga-
tion. But even among this actionable behavior, assuming the prob-
lem of "reluctant plaintiffs" did not exist,1 43 relatively few tort
cases would be brought. Tort relief is generally sought for more
serious infringements manifesting some sort of injury. This ten-
dency exists in pro sports in a magnified form, for in that arena the
hard contact is the norm, and invincibility often the image. Thus,
prospective plaintiffs consider civil litigation only when playing
field contacts result in very serious physical injury. For example, in
the Hackbart case, had the blow delivered by "Booby" Clark re-
sulted in only minor injury, it is highly improbable that Dale
Hackbart would have ever even considered suit.14 4
Every NFL season is characterized by frequent incidents of vio-
lence, many of which are unnecessary for effective football play
and are clearly avoidable.14' Because few of these contacts result in
142. See Note, Violence in Professional Sports, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 771, 776 (quoting
former NHL referee, Jack Mehlenbacher who asserted "[tihe bigwheels of the NHL figure
they have to have blood to fill the arenas."). See also The Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 20, 1975,
at 10, cd. 3.
143. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (discussing the reluctant plaintiff
phenomenon).
144. See 435 F. Supp. at 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev'd, 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979). Indeed, the trial record reveals that following the tortious blow
by Clark, Hackbart got up and returned to his team's sidelines without registering a com-
plaint either to Clark or the officials.




truly serious sudden injury akin to that visited upon Darryl Stin-
gley, 1 6 most of these blows go unchallenged and unremedied. This,
combined with the relatively brutal contact that is actually permit-
ted by the game's rules, has led pro football gradually to envelop
such behavior as customary or part of its "usages." Evidence sug-
gests that even if the needless and avoidable hits suddenly began
to be challenged, many would continue as consensual "usages. "147
Because the tort remedy would redress only sports' most serious
and tragic injuries, it does little to temper the brutal environment
out of which such injuries arise. The responsibility for the control
of this frequent use of violence, as will be discussed, must be re-
solved by mechanisms short of civil tort remedies. The tort suit is,
by its very nature, an inappropriate and impractical deterrent to
excessive violence in professional sports.
IV. CONTEMPORARY PROPOSALS TO CONTROL SPORTS VIOLENCE
Authority to make decisions relating to the control of player con-
duct has traditionally been left to those in the best position to ob-
serve, and with the most expertise to judge, that conduct to be
controlled - namely referees, umpires, and officials in general. In
effect, society has stayed its hand except in those instances where
the conduct has been so reprehensible as to warrant civil sanctions.
146. Demonstrative of the extremes of NFL official reaction to such gratuitous blows
are two events which occurred late last season. In each case, John Jefferson, an all-pro wide
receiver with the Green Bay Packers, was the recipient of a vicious, avoidable blow from an
opposing ballplayer. The first incident occurred on November 28 in a game between Jeffer-
son's Packers and the New York Jets. During that contest a Jet linebacker, George Blinka,
struck Jefferson in such a brutal and unnecessary manner that the Jets team was penalized
for Blinka's unnecessary roughness. After the game, in a rather rare move, the NFL sus-
pended Blinka from the following week's play. (Notably, this is precisely the type of official
response which, as will be seen, the proposal forwarded by this article desires to
institutionalize).
Ironically, only one month later, on December 26, Jefferson was again the object of a
clearly avoidable, vicious hit quite similar in its gratuitousness to the blow visited upon
Jefferson by Blinka. The Packers were now playing the Atlanta Falcons and this time the
hit was delivered by Falcons defensive back Bobby Butler. In this second instance, however,
none of the game officials issued a penalty and there was no league response following the
contest.
Due largely to good fortune, Jefferson escaped serious injury in both of the incidents.
What is condemned is the fact that there exists little within professional sports rules to
deter attacks such as these which needlessly risk serious injury or worse; little that is, be-
yond fortuitousness.
147. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS
§ 50, comment b, (extending consent to the "usages" or customs of the game); see also
supra text accompanying note 105 (quotation of RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 50,
comment b).
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The crippling injuries sustained by Darryl Stingley seemed des-
tined to produce change as commentators called for a crackdown
on sports violence and suggested a legislative response to fill the
gaps left by tort and criminal law.148 To be sure, the lesser stan-
dard of care of the recklessness standard of tort law, and the gen-
eral reluctance to employ the criminal law to punish participants,
had resulted in a broad range of player activity that continued un-
punished, and more importantly, undeterred, despite its inherently
violent nature. The legislative response initially proposed criminal
sanctions and later advanced establishment of a quasi-judicial
"Sports Court."
A. H.R. 2263 - Criminal Sanctions49
On March 3, 1981, H.R. 2263, known as the "Sports Violence Act
of 1981" was introduced in the Congress by Representative Ronald
Mottl of Ohio.18 0 The bill sought to amend chapter 7 of title 18 of
the United States Code. With respect to the control of player con-
duct, the bill provided in relevant part:
Excessive violence during professional sports events
(a) Whoever, as a player in a professional sports event, knowingly uses
excessive physical force and thereby causes a risk of significant bodily
injury to another person involved in that event shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 158
This portion of the bill is identical to provisions contained in an
earlier bill, H.R. 7903, which attracted swift and outspoken com-
ment from league officials, owners, and players. 
2
The imposition of criminal sanctions in the manner suggested by
148. See J. UNDERWOOD, supra note 3, at 45-47.
149. See supra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
150. H.R. 2263, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 Cong. Rec. H760 (1981). See H.R. 7903, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 2, 96th CONG. REC. 6946 (1980) (the predecessor to H.R. 2263).
151. H.R. 2263 § 115, supra note 150.
152. The commissioner of the National Football League, Pete Rozelle stated: "We
have reservations about the bill, although we appreciate what they're trying to do. It seems
to me that sports are occupying too much of the courts' time now." Tuite, Sports Violence:
Target of Federal Bill, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1980, Sports, at D 21, col. 1. Gil Stein of the
National Hockey League considered the legislation "unnecessary and redundant, inasmuch
as it ... cover[s] areas that are already covered by local laws." Id. And Bowie Kuhn stated:
"I really think baseball does a good job of controlling violence. I don't think that Federal
legislation would help." Id. Others within the sports world supported such legislation. Lloyd
Pettit of the Milwaukee Admirals of the International Hockey League, after forfeiting
playoff games because of outbreaks of violence, stated: "Hockey doesn't need this, [violence]
and someone has to say this is enough .... I'm not going to wait around for someone to be
killed in this game." Id.
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H.R. 2263 was problematic in two respects. First, there continued a
general reluctance among both legislators and members of the
sports community to countenance the rather harsh penalty of
criminal sanctions for actions taken on the playing field, notwith-
standing the hue and cry in the wake of the Tatum-Stingley inci-
dent.1" And second, the imposition of sanctions under the Act was
triggered by the use of "excessive violence," and such a label was
not subject to precise definition or easy identification. To the ex-
tent "excessive violence" presumed an intent component, similar
problems were evident as exist in the control of intentional acts in
general.'" The bill spoke of "knowingly" excessive violence but
was unclear as to how such conduct was to be identified by federal
prosecutors.
1 5 5
B. The Sports Violence Arbitration Act of 1981
On November 20, 1981, the "Sports Violence Arbitration Act of
1981" was introduced in the Congress also by Representative
Mottl.1  The legislation was based on a highly regarded student
note emanating from the University of Southern California Law
School, 5 = and on the research efforts of Miami attorney Richard
Horrow.1 8 In addition to establishing a uniform mechanism for the
imposition of fines and other sanctions upon players and clubs who
resort to excessive violence, the act also incorporated the provi-
sions of H.R. 2263 and made explicit the availability of criminal
penalties.
1. The Prototype Sports Court
The widely applauded Sports Court was the central feature of
what might be referred to here as the Southern California propo-
sal. 15 The Sports Court would function to "impose fines upon
clubs and hold them financially liable for any damage caused by
the violent conduct of their players. .. [and] . . . the court would
153. Even Darryl Stingley commented on the need to "be careful of drastic changes."
Id.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 98-108.
155. Id.
156. H.R. 5079, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H8759 (1981).
157. Office of United States Congressman Mottl, Press Release (Nov. 20, 1981).
158. The Sports Court, supra note 2. The note was authored by Chris J. Carlsen and
Matthew S. Walker and received the Norma Zarky Memorial Writing Award for a note or
comment in the field of entertainment law.
159. The Sports Court, supra note 2.
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impose fines and suspensions without pay upon players who engage
in violent conduct."10° Such a system was to create financial disin-
centives to resort to violent conduct.
The Sports Court relied primarily for its corpus juris on what is
described as the "player conduct policy." 1 The policy would de-
fine the class of conduct subject to review and evaluation for the
potential imposition of pecuniary sanctions by the court. The court
was to be comprised of a three member tribunal, "familiar with the
rules and practices of the sports they regulate." '162
The operative procedures for the Sports Court were to parallel
many of the procedures found in dispute resolution before the
American Arbitration Association. The process was to be initiated
by the filing of a grievance, presumably containing an allegation by
a player or his representative that certain conduct injuring him vi-
olated the "player conduct policy." The note describes the result-
ing process as follows:
The Sports Court would hear the grievance and determine if the injuring
player's conduct was violent. If the conduct was violent, and it caused the
injured player harm, the Court would relieve the injured player's club of
compensatory and medical obligations owed to him and impose these obli-
gations on the injuring player's club.' 63
Evidentiary rules were to be structured to accommodate relevant
evidence on the issue of the violation, as well as the conduct's vio-
lation of rules of play. The court was also to hear testimony about
the prior record of accused parties and their pattern of resorting to
violent conduct.
In keeping with the binding nature of arbitration procedures,
under the proposal no appeal could be taken from the decision of
the Sports Court absent a showing of "fraud, corruption, or other
160. Id. at 414.
161. Id. at 415.
162. Id. at 427.
163. Id. Under a legal theory analogized by the authors to the tort doctrine of respon-
deat superior, the Sports Court would have authority to impose various penalties on clubs
relating to the consequences of the injury-creating conduct:
1. Pay the salary of the injured player during the period in which the player is physi-
cally unable, because of injuries suffered, to perform the services required of him
under contract;
2. Pay all medical expenses incurred in the treatment of the injury;
3. Pay damages to the injured player if the injury prevents the player from partici-
pating in league play in later seasons;
4. Pay damages, or relinquish a draft choice, to the injured player's club for the loss




misconduct."1114 The proponents anticipated that judicial confi-
dence with the binding nature of other arbitration procedures
would carry over to the enforcement of Sports Court decisions.' 5
The Sports Court was to maintain authority to enforce its decision
and enforce compliance with its proceedings.
A principal concern of the Sports Court authors was the method
to be used to implement the court."6 They suggested the use of
either legislation or collective bargaining; under the "Sports Vio-
lence Arbitration Act of 1981," they got both.
2. The Proposed Arbitration Board
The central feature of the "Sports Violence Arbitration Act of
1981" was an arbitration board modeled after Southern Califor-
nia's proposed Sports Court. Both mechanisms were a response to
the sporadic use of league sanctions to curb violence,167 and the
perceived need to provide some efficient quasi-judicial relief to in-
jured players.
The purpose of the board, as defined by the terms of the Act,
was to provide "for the settlement of grievances resulting from the
use of excessive force during professional sports events. .... 8
The intent of the legislators was "to reduce the number and costs
164. Id. at 431. The authors considered traditional non-appealability as necessary to
facilitate "speedy and economically efficient dispute resolution." Under the "Sports Vio-
lence Arbitration Act", appeals were to be available as a matter of right to the United States
court of appeals for the circuit where the petitioner resides. See infra text accompanying
notes 167-75.
165. The Sports Court, supra note 2, at 431-32.
166. Id. at 418-22.
167. See supra notes 148-50. The power of league officials to control violent conduct is
found in their authority to impose fines, suspensions, or consider grievances:
Final Decision by Highest
Sport Executive
1. American and National Baseball Fines and suspensions for conduct on the
Leagues field, or conduct that involves the
integrity of the game.
2. National Football League All non-injury grievances.
3. National Basketball Association Fines and suspensions for conduct on the
court, or conduct that involves the
integrity of the game.
4. National Hockey League All general grievances.
Id. at n.132. Commissioners actually have sole discretion over the imposition of suspensions
and fines to the exclusion of owners. See National Football League Players Assoc. v. NLRB,
503 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1974).
168. H.R. 5079 § 3101, supra note 156.
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of injuries associated with such events.' ' 69
The language of the Act did not refer to the Sports Court explic-
itly, but like it, called upon management and player representa-
tives to establish an arbitration panel consisting of three members.
The procedure for selecting arbitrators as well as the criteria to
govern the grievance process was itself to be resolved as a matter
of collective bargaining.
17 0
The legislation did not refer specifically to a "player conduct
policy" but spoke of "excessive physical force" as:
[Pihysical force employed during a professional sports event which -
(A) has no reasonable relationship to the competitive goals of the sport
involved;
(B) is unreasonably violent; and
(C) could not be reasonably foreseen, or was not consented to, by the,
injured individual, as a normal hazard associated with participation as a
player in such professional sports events .... 171
The jurisdiction of the arbitration board would have extended to
all matters arising from the use of excessive physical force in the
sports context.17 It would have been empowered to award compen-
sation to aggrieved parties for violent conduct as well as impose
disciplinary actions against players and clubs who use or promote
the use of excessive physical force. 73 In addition, all orders of the
board were to be appealable to the United States court of ap-
peals. '7  And, finally, a grievance brought before the arbitration
169. Id. Mr. Mottl, in a press release, indicated that the primary purpose of the bill
was "to deter and punish the episodes of excessive violence that are characterizing profes-
sional sports." Mottl stated that such legislation would ensure that the professional sport
leagues take the lead in protecting their players. Office of United States Congressman Mottl,
Press Release (Nov. 20, 1981).
170. In addition, section 3106 of the Act provided that the National Labor Relations
Board was to recommend policies, rules, and procedures applicable to the arbitration pro-
ceedings. See H.R. 5079 § 3016, supra note 156.
171. See H.R. 5079 § 3101, supra note 156.
172. Id. at § 3103.
173. Id. The Act provided some guidance on what was to inform the board's discretion
when it considered the severity of sanctions to be imposed:
(1) the extent of any injgiries sustained by the aggrieved player involved;
(2) the duration of any period during which such player is unable to participate
in professional sports events as a result of such injuries;
(3) the amount of salary paid to such player by the aggrieved professional sports
club involved during such period; and
(4) the amount of any medical benefits or other compensation paid to or in on
behalf of such player by such professional sports club as a result of such injuries.
Id.
174. Section 3104 of the Act provided:
Review of arbitration orders
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board was not to be a bar to a separate civil action; all compensa-
tion awarded by the board was to be reduced by the amount of any
monetary award arising from a civil action. 17 5
V. THE CASE AGAINST INDEPENDENT ARBITRATION To CONTROL
VIOLENCE
A. Confusing Conduct Standards
The foregoing legislation and the Southern California proposal
each suggest an arbitration mechanism which would proscribe par-
ticular conduct, as defined by the several plans, which involves the
use of 'excessive physical force.'1 76 The operative effect of the im-
position of independent quasi-judicial sanctions based on such a
standard is the creation of a second standard to guide player con-
duct on the playing field. Proponents of the Southern California
proposal presumed as much when they argued that the current
standard of conduct, which is defined by rules of play and other
internal penalty systems, did not sufficiently deter violent con-
duct.17 7 The result - as indicated below - would have been to
create a system that would have allowed unproscribed conduct
(a) Not later than sixty days after the issuance of an order by an arbitration
board under section 3103 of this title, any person adversely affected by such order
may file a petition, with the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which
such person resides or has his principal place of business, for judicial review of such
order.
(b) Upon the filing of a petition under subsection (a) of this section, the court
shall have jurisdiction to review the order issued by the arbitration board in accor-
dance with chapter 7 of title 5. The court shall have authority to grant appropriate
relief as provided in such chapter.
(c) For purposes of this section, an arbitration board shall be considered to be an
agency within the meaning of section 701(b)(1) of title 5.
H.R. 5079 § 3104, supra note 156.
175. Section 3105 of the Act provided:
Any player or professional sports club bringing an action before an arbitration
board under section 3103(a) of this title shall not, by reason of such action, be barred
from instituting a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction based upon the
occurrence which is the subject of the action brought before the arbitration board,
except that any compensation awarded by the arbitration board under section
3103(b)(1) of this title shall be reduced by an amount equal to the amount of any
monetary settlement or award in any such civil action.
Id.
176. H.R. 5079 § 3101, supra note 156. Representative Mottl, in his press release
spoke of the difference between natural physical conduct and vicious, dangerous conduct.
See Office of United States Congressman Mottl, Press Release (Nov. 20, 1981). H.R. 5079
was unspecific as to what was to guide league officials in formulating an 'excessive physical
force' standard to distinguish vicious from the acceptably competitive conduct.
177. The Sports Court, supra note 2, at 404-05.
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(those actions not violative of the rules of play) to become actiona-
ble. The only way to make Jack Tatum responsive to acceptable
levels of competitive conduct, for example, would have been to
bring him before an arbitration board or Sports Court even though
his actions violated no game rule.
SPORTS COURT JURISDICTIONAL
ZONEI
ZONE A ZOE B ZONE C
Actionable
Unproscribed Proscribed
by Rules by Rules
of Play of Play
The zone of conduct actionable under a system which incorporates
an external standard would have been measurably broadened to
include a class of conduct not proscribed by the rules of play. The
jurisdictional zone thus established by an arbitration board or
Sports Court might be, for ease of discussion, aptly described as a
"twilight zone." The "twilight zone" label appropriately describes
the jurisdiction of the arbitration-based system where players are
informed by two separate standards, the more severe of which has
no basis in the rules of play.17 s
178. Dual standards do not arise in the context of actionable conduct redressed by
resort to traditional civil sanctions where such conduct by its nature violates the rules of
play. In the civil context, only when conduct violates the rules of play is a plaintiff likely to
avoid the defenses of assumption of the risk and consent. The defense of consent, for exam-
ple, was rejected in Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975), where
the court determined that a player could not have consented to conduct not within the
range of acceptable play. In Nabozny, the goalie-plaintiff was crouched in the penalty area
with a soccer ball, the rules prohibiting contact with the goal keeper while he remained in
this position. The defendant proceeded to run in the direction of the plaintiff and then kick
him in the side of the head. The court reversed a directed verdict in favor of the defendant,
refusing to grant him immunity from a tort action arising from his conduct in an amateur
athletic contest. The court held that a player should be liable for the injuries he causes
884
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The practical difficulties of expecting players to respond to a
"player conduct policy" centers around the athlete's capacity to
make a split second determination about the legality of his con-
duct, in addition to the more immediate and tangible decision of
whether his conduct will violate a game rule. The court established
this question in Regina v. Green,17 9 where the issue before the
court was whether the relevant conduct was an assault:
It is very difficult, in my opinion, for a player who is playing hockey with all
the force, vigor, and strength at his command, who is engaged in the rough
and tumble of the game, very often in a corner of the rink to stop and say, 'I
must not do that. I must not follow this up because maybe it is an assault
...[or a violation of the 'player conduct policy']. 180
The potential effect of a bifurcated system of conduct controls is
to stifle the competitive play of athletes who, in the heat of compe-
tition, would be forced to make a quasi-judicial determinaton of
what the likely ruling of the arbitration board or Sports Court
would be, or suffer the pecuniary-professional consequences of
their actions. And because liability would most often turn on the
peculiar facts attending various incidents of violence, predictions
of potential liability could be speculative and uninformed, particu-
larly where such liability is not keyed to an accepted set of rules.18'
Even though the definition of 'excessive physical force' con-
tained in the Act does not correlate, in any way, to the rules of
play, Representative Mottl in the press release indicated that the
arbitration board "could suspend without pay and impose fines on
the player who flagrantly violated the rules protecting players in
competition.' ' 82 It is at least ambiguous whether the Congressman
invoked his meaning of the words 'excessive physical force' only
when his conduct is either deliberate, wilful or with a reckless disregard for the safety of the
other player. The court also rejected the defendant's allegations that the plaintiff has been
contributorily negligent. The court's holding, interpreting Prosser, and the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 50, comment b, removed consent as a viable defense to an action when
the rules have been violated. Id. at 213, 334 N.E.2d at 260-61.
179. 16 D.L.R.3d 137 (1970).
180. Id. at 141.
181. An argument might be made that the class of conduct actionable before an arbi-
tration board created in accordance with the proposed act and not violative of game rules, is
limited to unusual circumstances like the Tatum-Stingley incident and that the availability
of such sanctions, in fact, fills a void left by the limited scope of rules and effective civil
remedies. The instances where players would be subject to dual standards would be limited.
This interpretation is paradoxical, however, since the proposed act was itself an emotive
response to the Tatum-Stingley incident. This article takes the position that players must
be guided at all times by a single set of conduct controls tied to the rules of play.
182. See Office of United States Congressman Mottl, Press Release (Nov. 20, 1981).
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when the rules of play have been violated. Accordingly, it is argua-
ble that the intent of the legislation's sponsors was that rule-
breaking conduct would be required to invoke the jurisdiction of
the arbitration board. Furthermore, while the proposed legislation
itself was silent on the issue, § 3101(2)(C) of the Act called for
punishment of "excessive physical force" that could not be reason-
ably foreseen or had not been consented to. A lack of consent in
this context, as has been shown, generally implies rule-breaking
conduct where the defense of consent is unavailable.
1 8 3
If sponsors intended that rule-breaking conduct be required to
invoke the jurisdiction of the arbitration board, the legislation
would have been problematic in two respects. First, it would have
provided no deterrent or sanction to control the conduct which
first gave fuel to the legislative initiative - namely, the type of
unproscribed conduct which gives rise to unacceptable injury as in
the Stingley-Tatum incident. Second, such a proposal would have
served to de-legitimize traditional mechanisms of relief already
available for injuries sustained by rule-breaking conduct by pro-
moting access to a quasi-judicial arbitration board. The failure of
leagues to act to sanction violent conduct more vigorously when
rules are broken under the existing system suggests that they are
not likely to act aggressively in negotiating, implementing, and su-
pervising an arbitration system focusing on the same conduct.
B. Problems of Implementation
1. Tacit Resistance of League and Player Representatives
The Sports Violence Arbitration Act of 1981, as proposed, was
dependent for its effectiveness on the cooperation of management
and player representatives in the drafting of the terms and re-
quirements relating to the establishment of each arbitration sys-
tem."' The terms of the Act mandated the inclusion of this subject
in the collective bargaining argument applicable to the league of
professional sports clubs involved. 185 The effectiveness of declaring
183. H.R. 5079 § 3101, supra note 156.
184. The legislation called for the establishment of an arbitration system for each
league of professional sports as defined by the terms of the act to include the sports of
baseball, basketball, football, hockey or soccer.
185. See H.R. 5079 § 3102(a), (b), supra note 156.
The Southern California proposal, which suggested either collective bargaining or fed-
eral legislation for the implementation of the Sports Court, articulated three assumptions in
its discussion of the former:
(1) Collective bargaining is already established in most professional leagues, (2) The
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a subject a mandatory bargaining issue generally presumes that at
least one party sufficiently identifies its position with one side of
an issue to encourage productive bargaining. When neither side
feels compelled to discuss the issue, productive negotiations are
likely to be concentrated on other matters of more immediate con-
cern. Notwithstanding the legislative mandate, nothing in the Act
would appear to prevent foot-dragging on the part of player and
management representatives. The reluctance of leagues, players,
and clubs to enforce a stricter pattern of conduct control suggests
that it is unlikely they would be willing to take seriously their re-
sponsibility in shaping the operative framework of an arbitration
board or Sports Court. The undesirability of exposing themselves
to potential liability and of relinquishing traditional authority over
player conduct to an autonomous tribunal is apparent. '86
The Southern California proposal anticipated reluctant league
and player representatives and suggested federal legislation to pro-
vide minimum standards to guide the participants in collective
bargaining.1 8 7 In mandating the formation of an arbitration board,
however, the proposed act offered little guidance in assuring mini-
mum standards. It is unclear how reluctant representatives are to
be persuaded to bargain in earnest, where the object of negotia-
tions - to control and provide redress for the use of "excessive
physical force" - was mandated in conclusory fashion and in
vague terms. All operative provisions dealing with the award of
compensation and the imposition of disciplinary actions were de-
fined in terms of prohibiting "excessive physical force."188 Defining
the practical scope of what constitutes "excessive physical force,"
in effect, was left exclusively to league and player representatives.
Accordingly, it was they alone who would dictate the operation of
the Sports Violence Arbitration Act of 1981 with unbridled discre-
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. I 1978),
is applicable to each league's management and players' association .... (3) The role
of labor arbitration is closely intertwined with federal labor policy.
The Sports Court, supra note 2, at 418 n.79.
186. The Southern California proposal noted this problem in suggesting that federal
legislation might be needed to assure adoption of the Sports Court:
The Sports Court would become a third power with a good deal of control and influ-
ence over the powers that created it. A conservative league management and players'
association may not want to relinquish any of their own disciplinary powers; thus,
both entities may refuse to bargain on the subject of the Sports Court. Therefore, it
may be necessary to establish the Sports Court through federal legislation.
The Sports Court, supra note 2, at 420.
187. Id. at 421.
188. H.R. 5079 § 3103, supra note 156.
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tion over the adjustment of any minimum standard."'9
2. Problems of Procedure
The Sports Violence Arbitration Act of 1981 contained two pro-
visions which addressed the need to provide procedural safeguards
to those litigations before the proposed arbitration board.190 Sec-
tion 3102 stated in relevant part:
(b) The terms and requirements relating to each arbitration system estab-
lished under sub-section (a) of this section shall be included in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement applicable to the league of professional sports
clubs involved. Such terms and requirements shall include -
(5) procedures for the adjudication of grievances (subject to the
requirements of section 3103 of title).1"'
Section 3106 which called upon the National Labor Relations
Board to "recommend policies, rules, and procedures applicable to
arbitration proceedings under this chapter," contained a paragraph
which specifically called for "procedural protections for parties
participating in such proceedings."192 The section also contained a
proviso which made it clear that the recommendations of the
Board would not be binding in any arbitration proceeding under
the Act."'
For the most part, therefore, responsibility and actual authority
over the promulgation and enforcement of procedural safeguards
was left to league and player representatives subject to the non-
binding recommendations of the National Labor Relations Board.
There was no assurance under the terms of the act that when rep-
resentatives met in collective bargaining to shape the contours of
the arbitration system, they would consider minimal due process
requirements. 94
189. See supra text accompanying notes 161-70.
190. H.R. 5079 §§ 3102(b)(5), 3106(a)(1), supra note 156.
191. Id. § 3102(b)(5) (emphasis added).
192. Id. § 3106(a)(1).
193. Id. at § 3106(b).
194. The Southern California proposal suggested a number of procedural guidelines to
protect the due process rights of parties which extended to the examination of witnesses,
the admissibility of various types of evidence, and the availability of counsel. The Sports
Court, supra note 2, at 429-30. None of these considerations were addressed in the proposed
Act.
Due Process safeguards may have become particularly significant in the procedures
before an arbitration board where the findings of the board would have the effect of attach-
ing a stigma to the reputation of a player who has been adjudged "guilty" of using 'excessive
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3. "Excessive Physical Force" - A Vague Standard
The proposed legislation sought to eliminate "excessive physical
force" or that conduct it defined as having no reasonable relation-
ship to the competitive goals of a sport.195 League and player rep-
resentatives were accorded complete authority to determine what
conduct constituted excessive physical force. Defining the class of
conduct falling within the ambit of such a definition could have
provided league and player representatives unbounded discretion
in the formulation of standards of acceptable conduct.1
In addition, the legislation, as drafted, placed no significance on
the practical necessity of informing players how and when their
conduct would involve the use of "excessive physical force." The
legislation presupposed a system that would somehow result in the
codification of acceptable conduct through the decisional law of
the arbitration board but proposed no practical means by which
this was to be accomplished. To that extent, such a proposal pro-
vides little in the way of deterrence and amounts to nothing more
than a system for the redistribution of wealth based upon fault
and injury.
C. Limited Application - Limited Deterrence
The "Sports Violence Arbitration Act of 1981" focused primarily
on the control of injury-creating conduct. It succumbed to the al-
luring tendency to define the problem of violence in sports almost
exclusively in terms of the problem of needless injury in sports.
The rationale behind the proposal was that pecuniary responsibil-
ity for unacceptable conduct which resulted in injury would en-
courage a reduction in the use of such conduct. The proposed Act
defined the sanctions available before the arbitration board almost
exclusively in terms of monetary damages.19 7 The imposition of
physical force.' See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976); Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neigh-
borhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 446 (2d Cir. 1980); Rodriquez de Quinonez v. Perez, 596 F.2d
486, 489 (1st Cir. 1979); McKnight v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. 583 F.2d 1229, 1235
(3d Cir. 1978). A private association's failure to provide procedural safeguards may, in some
circumstances, also give rise to a private damage action without consideration of whether
the private association had a substantive basis for its actions. See Silver v. New York Stock
Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 365 n.18 (1963); Developments in the Law - Judicial Control of Ac-
tions of Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. REV. 983, 1026-37 (1963).
195. See H.R. 5079 § 3101, supra note 156.
196. It is not inconceivable that if league and player representatives sought to liber-
alize sanctions now in place for violent conduct that the legislation, as drafted, would have
had the effect of attaching federal approval to such an agreement.
197. See H.R. 5079 § 3103, supra note 156. It should be noted that damages are ex-
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such sanction was triggered when a party had been "aggrieved" by
the use of "excessive physical force."1 ' Such a grievance was likely
to occur only in the context of injury-creating episodes of violence.
Legislation which is preoccupied with the creation of a system
which endeavors to provide the injured player a chance to become
whole, is distinct from a mechanism of conduct control which ex-
acts a penalty, swift and sure, in the interest of deterring violent
conduct across the board." In effect, efforts to control violence, to
be effective, cannot be limited by the fortuity that a violent act
may result in serious injury. A broad range of the violent conduct
in professional sports does not create recognizable personal injury.
Those violent acts most likely to result in serious injury include
those acts where the resultant injury is actually intended. Inten-
tional acts are most likely to be meaningfully deterred under an
arbitration system yet they comprise but a fraction of the total pic-
ture of violence in sports. To the extent that non-injury-creating
violent conduct goes unredressed, the competitive atmosphere be-
comes conditioned to the use of violence and is readied for the in-
evitable occasion of excessive violence which causes monstrous per-
sonal injury. Accordingly, to focus on injury-creating conduct in
the hopes of reducing violence in sports is to recognize only the tip
of the iceberg.20
D. Towards a Proposal for Violence Control
1. Elimination of the Twilight Zone
The principal objection with any system of conduct control that
creates a "twilight zone," as did the Sports Violence Arbitration
Act of 1981, is that players are simply not informed in their action
by a single reliable standard. Any effort seeking to establish more
acted from the sports club rather than the individual perpetrator. It is conceivable that a
player could conclude that his need to resort to violent play outweighs the potential cost to
be borne by his team.
198. Id.
199. The former is not unlike the prospect of recovery in the civil context where the
relief sought is in effect post hoc and as such will do little to control overall levels of vio-
lence. See supra notes 85-147 and accompanying text (broad discussion of the civil law
remedy).
200. The Southern California proposal properly focused on the necessity to control
non-injury creating violent conduct. The proposal recognized that such conduct could lead
to future injuries. The proposal suggested the use of a "Penalty Grievance" to sanction indi-
viduals and clubs who engage in violent conduct. See The Sports Court, supra note 2, at
417. This aspect of the Southern California proposal was not incorporated in the proposed
Act. Id. at 435, n.182.
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stringent standards in an attempt to modify behavior must, above
all, be internally consistent with the rules of play of the various
sports. If certain conduct is to be regarded generally as unaccept-
able, it must be sanctioned, as well, by the rules of play where pen-
alties are exacted on the spot, and where players are guided in
their actions by a set of rules inextricably woven to the notion of
how each sport is effectively played. The decisions of the arbi-
traton board proposed under the Act may have succeeded as a
means of retribution but would have failed as a working guide to
team and player conduct. Moreover, to hold someone monetarily
responsible for conduct which does not violate the rules of the
game offends basic notions of fair play.
Efforts and conduct modification, therefore, if they are to be
successful must be based on rules of play reform. The conduct
model demonstrates the appropriate adjustment which would re-











2. Identifying Player Incentives To Achieve Deterrence
The Southern California proposal contrasts the clean play of the
American Hockey Team in Montreal with the violence and fighting
of the NHL and notes that the difference can be traced to the
stringent sanctions of Olympic rules.201 The proposal, like the leg-
islation, nonetheless argued that any effort at violence control
must be of a pecuniary design, since financial incentive is the pri-
mary motivating factor of professional athletes. To achieve real de-
terrence, it is necessary to look beneath the economic justification
theory of violence. The use of financial disincentives to control vio-
lence presumes the following chain:
CLUB (TEAM) INCENTIVE
*O MODEL
1 2 3 4 5
Desire for - Desire - p Promotion - 0. Victory - Financial
Financially for of Reward
Successful Club Victory Conduct
Necessary for
Victory
The Sports Violence Arbitration Act of 1981 ignored the crucial
role of winning in team and individual motivations, and, moreover,
ignored the relationship of winning to financial reward. The ac-
tions of an arbitration board or Sports Court would focus com-
pletely on the fifth factor of the foregoing and succeeding model.
Both systems would ignore factors 2-4.
201. "[P]layers are immediately ejected and cannot play in the following game." See
The Sports Court, supra note 2, at 440 (citing L.A. Times, Mar. 24, 1981 § 3, at 6, col. 1).
202. This incentive model, arguably, might be less applicable to professional football
since earnings are divided among the clubs in practically equal shares. This may give such


















Steps 2-4 are ignored by the proposed legislation and the arbi-
tration board which was designed to focus on financial punish-
ment. The violation of game rules is punishable by individual and
team penalties relating to both victory, and more significantly, to
the capacity for individual distinction. Accordingly, rule reform
cuts right to the heart of the incentives found in steps 2 through 4.
And where incentives for individual participants are tied even
more closely to their desire for skillful and effective play, rule re-
forms will encourage aggressive adherence to rules as a means of
excelling.
It is clear, therefore, that in order to be financially successful, an
individual must excel and he cannot excel if he is guilty of chronic
rule breaking that could exclude his participation from any con-
test. Similarly, a team must be victorious to achieve financial re-
wards, and it cannot do so by condoning the chronic violation of
rules by its players. Clearly, it would neither behoove Jack Tatum
nor his team to be penalized yards, playing time, and/or standing
in the interest of intimidating a pass receiver like Darryl Stingley.
If rulemaking in sports has achieved dubious results, it is due to
a failure to bind the incentives alluded to above with the enforce-
ment of strict, principled, and uncompromising rules. Hockey play-
ers, simply put, would fight less if they were forced to play less and
pay dearly as a result. Clearly, two minutes in the penalty box does
not compromise their ability to exploit these incentives, clearly two
years off the ice would, and perhaps two days would be sufficient.
A recent Stanford Research Institute study indicates that only
1.3% of game injuries involve rule-violating conduct; this factor is
acknowledged by proponents of the Southern California propo-
sal. 03 Rather than acknowledge the need for rule reform, commen-
tators often focus on the use of the consent defense in situations of
violence involving unprosecuted conduct (i.e., conduct not prohib-
ited by rules is consented to). This defense, they argue, destroys
the effectiveness of tort measures to reduce violence and legiti-
mizes the creation of an arbitration board. This reasoning is self-
defeating. If rules were reformed to cover the presently unpros-
203. See J. UNDERWOOD, supra note 3, at 177.
Those in the blood bond who excuse the violence consider this proof that players are
basically rules-abiding fellows and ought to be left alone. There is another way to
look at that percentage. If "illegal acts" are not responsible for the outrageous num-
ber of injuries, then the fault lies within the rules, in things that are happening that
ought to be illegal.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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cribed violent conduct, the traditional reliance on tort recovery
would be revitalized since resort to the consent defense would be
ineffective. This argument is crucial to any notion of rule reform.
To the extent reliance on traditional mechanisms can be effec-
tive, equity and cost considerations dictate that such reliance be
encouraged. Rule reform instituted to cover the conduct that is to
be eliminated, furthermore, brings the effort at sports violence
control in line with firmly established tort principles. 04
Another major feature of rule reform would be the spin-off regu-
lation of non-injury creating conduct that does not manifest itself
in any pecunious fashion but is nonetheless violent. Rule reform
would encourage a system of playing regulations that would sanc-
tion such conduct and, therefore, would provide the most effective
means of obtaining the most comprehensive conduct reform
measures.
3. Deciding Who Decides
Quasi-judicial and legislative bodies are simply without the ex-
pertise to fashion major efforts in the area of rule reform. Rule
reform must come from responsible officials familiar with the fine
nuances of effective play within each sport. The impetus, however,
for major improvement can come from legislative initiatives; in-
deed, this is surely the less restrictive alternative when compared
with the breadth of the legislative enactment of a quasi-judicial
organ such as an arbitration board.
VI. THE PROPOSAL: LEGISLATIVELY MANDATED RULE REFORM
A. The Incentive Model Revisited
Because many professional sports have essentially institutional-
ized excessive violence, measures to reform this conduct must be
woven into the very play of those sports. 5 The complexion of
sports must be altered to the extent necessary to excise that vio-
lence which has supplanted athletic skill as the key determinant of
success.206 Harkening back to the individual incentive model,0 7
204. See supra text accompanying note 105.
205. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text (suggesting need for internal con-
trols to redress institutionalized sports violence); supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text
(discussing key role of excessive violence as inextricably tied to winning).
206. It should be understood that the violence referred to here is not that violence
that is a necessary concomitant of the games as traditionally conceived. Rather, this state-
ment addresses that needless violence that has grown to plague American sports. This layer
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reference to the various factors constituting the model provides an
excellent guide by which to analyze proposed conduct reform mea-
sures. Again, the model's five factors represent the several ele-
ments motivating the professional athlete; to address these is to
address the gears that make pro sports tick.
The Individual Incentive Model primarily stresses the myriad
nature of an individual athlete's motives for competition and
thereby the varied factors which must be addressed by any propo-
sal which seeks to alter his behavior. To recap, factors 2-4 of the
Model relate in general to the actual playing of the game - either
the quality of individual play or the collective ends of individual
superiority, team success, or winning. Factor 5 of the Model,
financial reward, is a step removed from the coliseum but it is the
ultimate aim of the professional athlete. 208 A proposal which, like
an arbitration board, affects only this latter factor will be unable
to affect the broad manner in which sports are played for two rea-
sons. First, the financial reward, while significant, is but one of the
motives behind an athlete's participation in his sport; a remedy
addressing only this factor may well be overborne by contravening
motivations arising from the other elements of individual incentive
(2-4).29 Second, and perhaps more importantly, reliance on factor
of violence, excessive violence, has been imported into the games to facilitate success. See
Note, Violence in Professional Sports, Wis. L. REv. 771, 777 n.33 (1975) (coach quoted as
lauding brutality of the Philadelphia Flyers because it has brought great success). Violence
of this sort has, to varying degrees, contributed to winning to the exclusion of superior ath-
letic ability.
207. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
208. Although the pride in team success and in the quality of individual play is no
doubt important to the professional athlete, the monetary reward that drove the athlete to
turn professional is ultimately the central aim. Witness, for example, the case of former
Georgia running back and Heisman Trophy winner Herschel Walker. For two seasons the
phenomenal Walker rejected the temptation to forego his college eligibility and turn pro.
Throughout, Walker maintained that the quality of play of his team and a winning spirit
was far more important to him than money. See "20 Questions: Herschel Walker," 30 PLAY-
BOY 196, 236 (1983). This notwithstanding, Walker turned pro in February 1983, when he
accepted a multimillion dollar offer by the New Jersey Generals of the upstart United
States Football League. In so doing, Walker forewent a year of college eligibility, and chose
to begin his new career in a league predominated by players whose quality is arguably infer-
ior to that in the more established NFL. Clearly, the pull of the financial reward overcame
the interest in quality of play.
209. Although financial penalties could theoretically be fashioned in such a way as to
make the financial consideration effectively the sole determinant of behavior, such huge
penalties could be, as a practical matter, of little utility to regulate play where the behavior
sought to be deterred is relatively common. Cf. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar
Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 409, 410 (1980) (advocating use of graduated fines, instead
of imprisonment, to punish white collar criminals).
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5 is reliance on a factor external to the game itself and thus most
probably insufficient to change the way in which the game is
played.
Within the Individual Incentive scheme, internalized league di-
rected reform represents an approach that is more effective and
cost efficient in violence deterrence terms than one like the arbitra-
tion board, which relies exclusively on manipulation of finances.
Unlike the unidimensional board, league rule reform would operate
variously on any or all of the different planes of motivation repre-
sented by Factors 2-5. For example, as the severity of game penal-
ties increase, rule infractions have an increasing impact on the
ability of a team to win, factor 4. Also, the individual player's con-
duct can be substantially affected by more frequent use of penal-
ties aimed at a single individual rather than a team. To this end,
the current tendency among the several leagues is to rely heavily
on the use of fines.2 10 Penalties of this sort, limited as they are to
relatively small sums, 21 1 fail to effect the type of conduct modifica-
tion for individual players that would be attainable through alter-
native means. If the leagues were to increase the use of player sus-
pension, broad conduct reform would be likely.2 12 Unlike mere
fines, which at best impact solely on factor 5, player suspension
affects factors 2, 3 and 5, for the player is prevented from playing
and thus from reaping the personal gratification of competition
and refinement of his play. Moreover, the player's salary for the
suspended period is withheld. For professional athletes earning
upwards of $1,000,000 per year, loss of pay for even a single game
can supercede the league penalty ceiling.213 The use against indi-
210. See, e.g., NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASS'N, OFFICIAL RULES OF THE NATIONAL BASKET-
BALL ASSOCIATION 1982-1983. Demonstrative of the great reliance placed on fines in the
NBA, the primary penalty for such egregious fouls as fighting and the class of "flagrant"
fouls, characterized by the rules as "attempting to hurt an opponent [through] violent or
savage contact," is a mere fine. See Rule 12A, § VIII & comments § C. Suspension is availa-
ble at the sole discretion of the Commissioner.
211. The penalty ceiling for the "flagrant" foul in the NBA is $10,000. Considering
that the sort of behavior encompassed in this class of fouls may well be life threatening and
that many players in the league earn in excess of several hundred thousand dollars per year,
the utility of such a penalty is questionable.
212. But cf. Comment, Discipline in Professional Sports: The Need for Player Pro-
tection, 60 GEo. L.J. 771 (discussing need to protect pro athletes from deprivation of right
to work because of disciplinary measures, e.g., betting penalties).
213. For example, a player in the NBA earning $1,000,000 per year is paid approxi-
mately $12,900 per game. The penalty ceiling for flagrant fouls is $10,000. While it is readily
granted that few piayers actually earn such exorbitant salaries, the point remains that sus-




viduals of the penalty suspension without pay combined with the
assessment against teams of game penalties or fouls thus afford a
scheme of behavior control substantially more comprehensive, cer-
tain and direct than an external arbitration board. And, because
the process is an internal one, broad social economic efficiencies
are gained by foregoing the costs of litigation.
B. A Predicate to the Proposal: Classification of Unacceptably
Violent Conduct
The excessive violence addressed throughout this article can be
divided into two basic types: Purposeful and Non-Purposeful.214
The two groups into which this classification separates aggressive
athletic behavior facilitates an understanding of the proposal
which follows. To clarify the explanation of the points made in the
following analysis, and therefore in the proposal, key concepts are
often illustrated by reference to pro football.
1. Purposeful Violence
"Purposeful Violence" are those specific acts which, though not
essential to skillful play, do have some utility for effective partici-
pation as traditionally conceived. This behavior takes the form of
discrete, identifiable acts which are often more violent or danger-
ous variations of well-accepted incidents of the games. In the pro
football context, while the often brutal physical contact called
"blocking" is an accepted and vital portion of the game, certain
forms of blocking have developed over time which are extremely
dangerous. The "crackback" block and blocking below the waist on
a kick both arose as useful forms of the blocking convention; both
practices, however, frequently resulted in injury. Recently, there-
fore, the NFL chose to outlaw this type of conduct and made ei-
ther type of block punishable by a game penalty.2 1 5
Violence of this sort, tied as it is to the successful execution of a
particular play in a given game, can be effectively redressed by rule
214. The classification of violent conduct is distinguished from the general classifica-
tion of player conduct. As will be seen purposeful violence approximates proscribed conduct,
as non-purposeful violence approximates actionable conduct. As will be seen under this pro-
posal, violence is deterred where more purposeful conduct becomes proscribed and more
non-purposeful conduct becomes actionable. Compare supra text accompanying notes 52-61
and infra text accompanying notes 247-48.
215. See NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, OFFICiAL RuLEs FOR PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL
1982, [hereinafter cited as OFFIcIAL RULEs], Rule 12, § 1, art. 6 (outlawing blocking below
waist on kick); id. § 2, art. 10 (outlawing crackback block).
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changes making it illegal and assessing game penalties. Within the
limited span of a single play, a player's aim is almost exclusively
the success of that play, factors 2-4 on the Individual Incentive
Model; in fashioning his actions, the player will avoid discrete acts,
like a crackback block, which are clear rule violations, especially
where other similar acts, like a normal block, might possibly be
effective. In this way, rule reform at the game level effects a partial
catharsis of sports by rooting out one portion of the excess
violence.
2. Non-Purposeful Violence
"Non-Purposeful Violence" is excessively aggressive behavior
which bears very little relation to conventional play. While several
aims can be articulated for this brutality, 16 the most basic and
overriding goal is injury or intimidation.2 17 It is to be stressed, in
this vein, that the end of injury or intimidation means that the
contact would likely be among the most savage in sports - its very
purpose is to inflict pain. Unlike Purposeful Violence, this activity
is of little utility as a concomitant to skilled conventional play.
Moreover, because it both lacks the discrete, definable quality of
its Purposeful counterpart and often seeks to affect opponents'
play in the broad context of the game rather than during a given
play,218 this violence is perhaps less effectively deterred by game
penalties. 219 Notably, behavior of this sort is pervasive throughout
American sports, evidenced with particular ferocity in sports like
hockey and football which, even in their purest forms, assume a
substantial level of physical contact.
220
216. One major reason for this activity is fan appeal, a factor keenly present in profes-
sional hockey. See Note, Violence in Professional Sports, supra note 2, at 776. This not-
withstanding, the aim of fan appeal is probably an explanation for why the behavior is per-
mitted by the management, rather than explanatory of the aims of the athletes. To the
extent management feeds this trend, an argument can indeed be made for the need to deter
such tendencies by fines for teams as well as players in appropriate instances. Cf. Comment,
supra note 33 (discussing the application of respondeat superior doctrine in sports context).
217. See supra note 127 (discussing intimidation element inherent in play of defensive
backs in football).
218. See id. (solid hit by a defensive back on one play is designed to make receivers
hesitant to reach for difficult catches on a later play, where to do so it leaves the receiver
open for another blow).
219. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (game penalties are most effective
when the aim of a player's activity is success on a discrete play, instance, or period of time
in a contest).
220. Intimidation is not limited to the crushing hits of football defensive backs, noted
above. In baseball, pitchers frequently throw "brush back" pitches to particularly dangerous
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3. The Player Conduct Model and Violence Associated With
Purposeful and Non-Purposeful Conduct
Purposeful/Non-Purposeful Violence is plotted onto the Player
Conduct Model below prior to implementation of the proposed
rule reform measures. Effective analysis of the graph requires fo-
cused examination of each of its subsections. With respect to Pur-
poseful Violence, the upper half of the graph, the portion of Pur-
poseful Violence lying in the A-area represents that Purposeful
behavior in the aggregate which is currently permitted. Theoreti-
cally, this area could be reduced by additional safety measures.
GRAPH 1
PLAYER CONDUCT MODEL
PRE-PROPOSAL-ANALYSIS OF EXISTING RULES
hitters; normally, the aim of this is solely to intimidate and not actually to hit the batter.
Regardless, a baseball thrown at speeds up to and exceeding 100 miles per hour can easily
maim or kill. And, in basketball, generally perceived to be a relatively contact-free game, the




The B-area describes the converse of the A-area: the Purposeful
behavior lying within B is that conduct which has been proscribed
by rules of play. Finally, within the C-area, the marginal element
of Purposeful behavior represents acts which directly contravene
express safety measures. Because Purposeful Violence is, by defini-
tion, a usage of the game, one would surmise that such behavior
would be covered by the consent defense and thus be non-actiona-
ble. However, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 50 comment b22'
states a narrow exception to the consent defense for safety mea-
sures, thus making only these actionable. Notably, the precise de-
lineation of each of these areas will turn on the degree of effort
expended by a given sport to outlaw Purposeful Violence.
With respect to Non-Purposeful Violence, the lower half of the
graph, the portion of that violence lying in the shaded A-area rep-
resents behavior of that type which is currently deemed acceptable
conduct. The B-area indicates that conduct presently proscribed
by game rules. It should be emphasized that while a substantial
portion of Non-Purposeful Violence is covered by the existing
rules, the effectiveness of those sanctions, admittedly not reflected
in these graphs, is generally de minimus. Indeed, as revealed in the
C-area the amount of the proscribed conduct which is actionable is
notably scanty.
C. The Proposal - Rule Reform and the Federal Professional
Sports Violence Commission
To purify professional sports of the taint of excessive violence, it
is necessary to apply the optimal sanctions in a sufficiently focused
manner to redress the two particular classes of violence discussed
above. The following proposal requires a bi-level approach:
Level 1: continuous review and revision of rules of play to redress Pur-
poseful Violence at the game level;
Level 2: the establishment of:
(a) rules absolutely outlawing Non-Purposeful Violence;
(b) comprehensive penalties in the form of suspension without pay for
violation of these rules; and
(c) an effective and truly functional review mechanism by which each
league will regularly review game films to determine appropriate in-
stances to assess these penalties.
This article urges the adoption of comprehensive legislation to
deal specifically, for the first time, with rules of play reform in pro-
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 50, comment b (1965).
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fessional sports. The goals of such legislation are to reduce current
levels of violence and injury. Accordingly, the proposal addresses
the classes of violent conduct discussed above and the nature of
rule reform measures which will serve to reduce violent acts associ-
ated with both Purposeful and Non-Purposeful conduct.
1. Rule Reform in the Context of Purposeful Conduct
Rules which regulate violent conduct associated with otherwise
purposeful, high-utility play are currently in effect to some degree
in the major sports. Rule reform, to be effective, must both expand
the range of conduct to be governed by such rules and strengthen
the impact of those rules presently in place.
An example from current rules which addresses the likelihood of
violent injury associated with otherwise purposeful conduct is
found in Rule 12, section 2, article 10 of the Official Rules for Pro-
fessional Football 1982, dealing with the crackback block:
At the snap, an offensive player who is aligned in a position more than two
yards laterally outside of an offensive tackle or a player who is in a backfield
position and subsequently takes a position more than two yards outside a
tackle, may not clip an opponent anywhere, nor may he contact an oppo-
nent below the waist if the blocker is moving in toward the position of the
ball either at the snap or after it is made and the contact occurs within an
area five yards on either side of the line of scrimmage."'
Similarly, the general rules governing blocking exemplify current
rules which in regulating purposeful conduct also regulate injuries
and violence:
(1) Run Blocking is an aggressive action by a blocker to obstruct an oppo-
nent from the ball carrier.
(2) During a legal block, contact can be made with the head, shoulders,
hands, and/or outer surface of the forearm, or any other part of the body.
Hands, with extended arms, cannot be used to contact an opponent either
inside or outside the opponent's frame (or his frame).
(3) Blocker cannot use his hands, arms, or legs to grasp, trip, hang onto, or
encircle an opponent to gain an advantage.
(4) As the play develops, a blocker is permitted to work for and maintain
position of an opponent as long as he does not push from behind or clip
(outside legal clip zone). A blocker lined up more than 2 yards outside the
tackle is subject, also, to the crackback rule.2
3
Both of the above rules concern a form of hitting and both place
222. OFFIciAL RULES, supra note 215, at Rule 12, § 2, art. 10. This block known as the
illegal crackback block carries a penalty of fifteen yards.
223. Id. Rule 3, § 4 (emphasis in original).
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a limit on the character of the "aggressive play" that will accom-
pany a legal block.
2 4
a. Rule Expansion
Legislation to control violence through rule reform must call for
a measurable expansion of the playing conduct to which rules may
be applied. In short, there must be an across-the-board increase in
the rules which govern player contacts. These rules must articulate
with specificity the conduct to be proscribed. Further, they must
be geared to the prevention of injuries identified by a compilation
and interpretation of injury statistics that can be mandated by the
legislation itself.
A notorious example of injury creating conduct in professional
football involves those blocks and tackles undertaken when a
player's helmet is brought into alignment with his body to create a
veritable battering ram on contact. Injuries resulting from the
crushing impact of such blows are matched, in turn, by the head,
224. An example of purposeful conduct whose regulation also reduces injury creating
violent conduct is clipping which is regulated by Rule 3, § 6: "Clipping is throwing the body
across the back of the leg of an opponent or charging or falling back into the back of an
opponent below the waist after approaching him from behind, provided the opponent is not
a runner or it is not close line play." Id. (emphasis in original). This section must be read
with Rule 12, § 2, art. 9: "There shall be no clipping from behind below the waist ... This
does not apply to close line play or a runner.'! Id.
Other examples include the limitations placed on the use of hands, arms, and body in
Rule 12, § 1:
Article 1 No offensive player may:
(a) assist the runner except by individually blocking opponents for him.
(b) use interlocking interference. Interlocked interference means the grasping
of one another by encircling the body to any degree with the hands or arms; or
(c) push the runner or lift him to his feet.
Article 2 A runner may ward off opponents with his hands and arms, but no other
offensive player may use them to obstruct an opponent, by grasping with hands or
using them to push, or encircling with arm in any degree any part of body, during a
block....
Article 3 No player on offense may push or throw his body against a teammate either:
(a) in such a way as to cause him to assist runner, or
(b) to aid him in an attempt to obstruct an opponent or to recover a loose ball,
or
(c) to trip an opponent, or
(d) in charging, falling, or using hands on the body into the back from behind
above the waist of an opponent.
Id. See also, Rule 12, § 1, art. 4 (legal, illegal contact); id § 1, art. 5 (legal and illegal block);
id. § 1, art. 6 (blocking below waist on kick); id. § 2, art. 1 Personal Fouls (striking, kicking,
or kneeing); id. § 2, art. 2-3 (illegal, legal contact); id. § 2, art. 4 (striking); id. § 2, art. 5
(grasping face mask); id. § 2, art. 6 (running into kicker); id. § 2, art. 7 (piling on); id. § 2,
art. 11 (roughing passes).
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neck, and spinal injuries incurred by those who hit in such a man-
ner.2 2 5 These injuries are multiplied when this conduct is under-
taken by younger athletes who lack the massive neck and shoulder
strength to sustain the force of such impact.2
26
Accordingly, expanded rules could address the purposeful con-
duct of blocking and tackling and the associated violence created
by the use of the helmet as a weapon. John Underwood first called
for the prohibition of all deliberate helmet hits.2  Expanded rule
coverage could insure that "if the helmet makes initial contact in
blocking or tackling," the player would be penalized' 2 8 Underwood
has suggested other rule changes, many of which are associated
with purposeful, high-utility play, and which could be articulated
after enabling legislation mandated an expansion of current rule
coverage; they include the following:
2. Outlaw blocking below the waist on all downfield plays, or outside the
225. By 1978, helmet manufacturers in the United States faced lawsuits totalling close
to $150 million. Sustained litigation is regarded as the downfall of several manufacturers. J.
UNDERWOOD, supra note 3, at 101-102.
226. Particularly among amateur players, the shiny helmet has come to represent a
symbol of power and invincibility in American football. Underwood offers the following apt
commentary:
Today, plastered with decals like the fuselage of a World War II fighter plane, it
is a stylish-looking engineering marvel in two parts: a three-pound-plus artillery piece
of polycarbonate, styrene, and leather, honeycombed with pods of rubber, water, anti-
freeze, or foam, and costing up to $100. A player could stand on it. He could grow
tomatoes in it and it wouldn't leak. If he wanted to, he could drop it off a tall build-
ing and fracture the skulls of passersby.
Id. at 103.
Dr. Donald Cooper, medical consultant of the NCAA Rules Committee describes the
helmet as "the damnest, meanest tool on the face of the earth." And Underwood considers
the helmet" - a focal point of coaches' intransigence in teaching dangerous techniques; -
the piece of equipment with which players are most likely to do damage (to themselves and
their opponents) - and cause 80 percent of the games' fatalities." Id. at 100.
227. Id. at 178. In the days of leather, maskless helmets "you had to slip blows like a
boxer slips punches," said Dave Nelson of the NCAA Rules Committee. "You blocked with
your shoulder, you tackled with your shoulder. You didn't put your head in places they do
now." Id. at 103.
228. Id. at 178. It is likely that some inadvertent helmet hits would be inevitable. The
rules currently in effect include prohibitions and sanctions which distinguish conduct which
might be deliberate from that which is inadvertent. The "face-mask" rule found in Rule 12,
§ 2, art. 5, for example, distinguishes between tackles where the grasping of the mask is
incidental and where it is deliberate:
No player shall grasp the face mask of an opponent.
Penalty: Incidental grasping of the mask - five yards. Not a personal foul (if by the
defense there is no automatic first down). Twisting, turning, or pulling the mask -
15 yards. A personal foul. The player must be disqualified if the action is judged by
the official(s) to be of a vicious or flagrant nature.
OFFIciAL Ru zS, supra note 215, at 78.
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"legal clipping" zone. Ban the "chop block" and its relatives at the line of
scrimmage.
4. Institute a "grab" rule for defensive players tackling quarterbacks in
the act of passing, in which only the arms and hands would be used if "mo-
mentum" has caused the tackler to hit the quarterback after he passes. If
this proves unworkable, give the quarterback the same protection the
punter is given.
5. Institute a no-hit rule on receivers (until they catch the ball) and on
tailbacks in the option play. An offensive player without the ball should not
be fair game.
6. When it is evident that quarterbacks are being hit on certain types of
plays simply as a form of intimidation, warn the coach of the team responsi-
ble. If the practice persists, call personal fouls.
8. Outlaw all forms of "clubbing" or forearm blows on ball carriers and
receivers; outlaw all lead tackles save in interior line play.
b. Rule Strengthening
Part and parcel of meaningful rule reform is the bolstering of
existent rules that, by lax enforcement or weak sanctions, have be-
come ineffectual as deterrents to violent conduct. Players must be
informed that their violent conduct will draw a penalty that will
create competitive disadvantages for themselves and for their
teams.
An example of existing rule penalties, some of which were re-
ferred to in the foregoing section, include the following:
Rule 12, Section 2, Article 10 (Crackback block) - loss of 15 yards.130
Rule 12, Section 1, Articles 1-3 (Use of hands, arms, or body) - for holding,
illegal use of hands, arms or body of offense: loss of 10 yards.8 1
Rule 12, Section 2, Article 9 (Clipping) - loss of 15 yards. s
Many penalties provide for disqualification when the violation of
specific rules are flagrant.
Any effort at rule reform must increase the penalties to be alot-
ted under existing rules and under those rules enacted as a result
of expanded coverage. Underwood suggested that penalties be in-
creased for "flagrant fouls and unsportsmanlike acts to twenty
yards (minimum) or thirty yards.' ' 8 3 Penalties under rules which
involve a safety component or whose violation is likely to lead to
229. J. UNDERWOOD, supra note 3, at 178-79.
230. OFFICIAL RuLzs,.supra note 215, at 80.
231. Id. at 75.
232. Id. at 79.
233. J. UNDERWOOD, supra note 3, at 179.
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injuries should provide officials with discretion to impose 'greater
yardage' penalties and disqualification where appropriate.
c. Enhanced Enforcement
Finally, to be effective rule reform must be accompanied by spe-
cific measures that will assure that greater efforts will be made to
enforce the broader range of existing rules. The instructions to offi-
cials will focus on increased vigilance and particular attention to
contacts which yield high rates of injury.
Underwood, again, has suggested examples:
3. Instruct officials to enforce more stringently the rulings on late, redun-
dant, or unnecessary hits, be they on ballcarriers, receivers, or quarterbacks.
The criterion at its most rudimentary (sic) would be to make tacklers re-
sponsible for knowing when a player is stopped, helpless, or already going
down.
4. Crack-down on all "momentum" tackles involving out-of-bounds plays
and forward progress. A player on offense knows where the boundary lines
are; the defensive players should, too.'"
d. Overview
Legislation would be effective which called for the mandatory
expansion and strengthening of existing rules as per the specific
recommendations of a joint committee of Federal Sports Commis-
sion members and league officials. Compilation of injury statistics,
and a "central registry" of injuries should be dictated by the terms
of the legislation. 5 In addition, periodic review of increased en-
forcement procedures should be required by the legislation. The
general nature of the legislation would assure its application to all
sports and facilitate its specific tailoring to each sport by directing
that specific measures be drafted and adopted by the commission
members and league officials working in earnest at implementing
the legislative goals.
2. Rule Reform in the Context of Non-Purposeful Conduct
The second level of rule reform advanced by the proposal calls
upon all professional sports leagues to establish strict new rules
outlawing acts of violence executed with the intent to intimidate or
injure. The penalties associated with these new rules would be
234. Id. at 178-79.
235. See, e.g., id. at 179.
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comprehensive in nature: suspension without pay, implicating fac-
tors 2-5. Unlike the level 1 on-the-field conduct controls, however,
level 2 reforms would be assessed primarily after post hoc review of
game films by officials specially designated by the several leagues.
The aim of purging pro sports of all Non-Purposeful Violence re-
quires the assessment of penalties for all incidents of such behav-
ior, regardless of whether the game officials notice the infraction.
a. Existing (Roughness) Rule Expansion
The new rules and penalty proposed in level 2 would not yield a
dual standard of conduct to which athletes would have to abide;
the penalty would constitute off-the-field enforcement of rules
proscribing flagrant fouls or unnecessary roughness which cur-
rently exist in all sports.236 Thus, the rule reform of level 2 would
include expansion of the existing violence delimiting rules -
flagrant foul and roughness - to include hits made with the intent
to injure or intimidate.
For example, the existing "Unnecessary Roughness" rule in the
National Football League states:
There shall be no unnecessary roughness. This shall include, but will not be
limited to:
(e) running or diving into, or throwing the body against or on a player obvi-
ously out of the play, before or after the ball is dead;
(h) any player who uses the crown or top of his helmet against a passer, a





The proposed rules outlawing violence to intimidate or injure
would effectively extrapolate from these rules to institute, among
other things, a no hit rule on receivers (until they touch the ball)
and on running backs on the option play.238 And, a player would be
penalized under the new rules if, in the act of hitting an opponent,
the player intentionally uses force exceeding that necessary to
achieve his task. Again, the determination of intent would devolve
to the post hoc league oversight mechanism.
236. See, e.g., OFFICIAL RuLEs, supra note 215, at Rule 12, § 2, art. 8 (unnecessary
roughness), id. art. 6 (roughing the kicker), id. art. 11 (roughing the passer); NATIONAL BAs-
KETBALL Ass'N, OFFICIAL RuLEs OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 1982-83, Rule 12
comments § C (flagrant foul).
237. OFFICIAL RuLEsS, supra note 215, at Rule 12, § 2, art. 8 (emphasis added).
238. See J. UNDERWOOD, supra note 3, at 178.
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The necessity of the level 2 measures which extend beyond the
level 1-type rules with on-the-field penalties stems from the inher-
ent limits of on-the-field penalties. Typically, on-the-field penalties
have an uncertain impact upon the game's outcome.239 Thus, the
Individual Incentive factors 2-4 are scarcely affected in any direct
manner. Furthermore, financial ramifications from these penalties
are presently rare, and when they do occur, usually in the form of a
fine, the assessment is often de minimus2 40
b. Existing (Roughness) Rule Strengthening
In addition to expanding the scope of roughness rules thereby
promoting heightened diligence by game referees,"41 level 2 calls
for new rules which would strengthen penalties thereby providing
the greatest possible deterrent. As examined above,242 the type of
penalty that would be imposed by the league for incidents of vio-
lence with the intent to injure or intimidate significantly affects
factors 2-5 on the Individual Incentive Model. The strength of this
penalty is evinced when one considers that game penalties affect
primarily factors 2-4 and that the impact on factors 2-4 may well
be only marginal. The stiff level 2 penalties thus lend a broad and
lasting deterrent effect to its rules.
c. Enhanced Enforcement
As a function of and complement to its strict penalty provisions,
level 2 provides that determinations of rule infractions are to be
made by officials, designated by each league, in a post hoc review
of game films. Such an approach is necessitated by the severe na-
ture of the penalties meted out. The harsh punishment at stake
requires that the determination of culpability be made with the
utmost care, arguing potently for giving deference to review of
game films.243
239. For example, in football a rule infraction affects only the play in which it occurs
and only directly impacts on the game's outcome if the play happens to be a crucial one.
240. See supra note 211.
241. Cf. Official Rules, supra note 215, at Rule 12, § 2, art. 11, supp. note (i) (rules
indicate broad policy of protecting passer and implement policy partially by "Quick Whis-
tle" provision).
242. See supra notes 211-13, and accompanying text (detailing effect of suspension
without pay in terms of Individual Incentive Model).
243. As the determination of culpability will turn on intent, stringent measures includ-
ing official review of the best available evidence will be required. Expert review of films
constitutes just such a measure.
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Post hoc review of game films also works to heighten deterrence
even beyond the level attained through strict penalties by allowing
for absolutely comprehensive enforcement of the new level 2 rules.
The on-the-field enforcement of most existing rules leaves a large
margin for human error - referees can not see all the activity that
occurs and thus occasionally miss rule infractions. Game film re-
view obviates this problem and in so doing makes enforcement
more certain and the strict penalties associated therewith more
real.
3. The Federal Professional Sports Violence Commission
It is highly likely that federal legislation merely proclaiming a
plan so unconventional as the proposal advanced in this article
would, in all probability, fail for noncompliance. Success of the
concept, therefore, requires federal execution of the plan through a
federal overseeing body: the Federal Professional Sports Violence
Commission. The purpose and function of this Commission would
extend solely to macro-level enforcement of the legislative man-
date: the Commission would police the several professional sports
leagues to insure adequate progress toward the legislative mandate
at both levels 1 and 2. The Commission would be without jurisdic-
tion to invade upon any league's resolution of an individual case or
incident, and would be solely concerned with the institutionaliza-
tion of violence control mechanisms in professional sports. If the
problem of official non-compliance proves to be an ephemeral one,
the Commission would be unnecessary beyond the medium term.
To this end, federal enabling legislation should include a sunset
provision mandating Congressional review of the necessity of the
continued existence of the Commission after five years of
operation.2 4'
a. Composition of the Commission
The Commission could consist of five commissioners each of
whom have distinguished themselves in sport, sport-related activi-
ties, or government, and will be headed by a chief commissioner.
The commissioners will be aided by a support staff of a size and
composition as is necessary to aid in the effective execution of the
oversight function. At a minimum, such a staff will include a legal
244. This review may well determine that the FPSVC should be preserved as a watch-
dog but, due to broad institutionalization of the rules mandated by the Commission's ena-
bling legislation, need not continue in its expanded form.
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staff headed by a general counsel and a staff of sports experts with
extensive exposure in one or another of each of the professional
sports to be affected by the legislative mandate.
b. Function of the Commission
The primary function of the Commission would be to ensure the
fulfillment of the legislative mandate embodying levels 1 and 2 of
the proposal. As such, the Commission would oversee the estab-
lishment of rules and penalties in an effort to control violence in
every professional sports league. The Commission would also work
with the several leagues to establish mechanisms for continuous re-
view and revision of rules of play to redress Purposeful Violence at
the game level. In this capacity, the National Football League has
made an effort to review, develop and revise its safety rules.245
While the Commission would be available to interested leagues as
a reference tool to help develop programs which comply with the
legislative mandate, such collaboration would not be mandatory.
As detailed hereafter, a central aim of this proposal is to effect the
broad, thorough change sought with the least possible intrusion.
To this end, many of the decisions and mechanisms associated
with this plan are to be implemented in a decentralized fashion
with as much discretion as possible afforded to the leagues. The
aim is to direct a catharsis of the American game, rather than a
metamorphosis.
With respect to both levels of rule reform, the Commission's key
duty would be to shepherd professional sports toward institution-
alization of the mandated reforms. Though made earlier, the point
must be stressed that the Commission would operate solely on the
macro-level and would absolutely avoid involvement with affairs of
an individual nature. In the interest of non-intrusiveness, league
resolution of individual incidents would be considered only as it
relates to the question of progress towards institutionalization of
mechanisms to fulfill the legislative mandate.
245. For example, in only the past few years, the NFL has altered its rules to: (1)
provide greater protection for the quarterback, Rule 12, § 2, art. 11; outlaw the "crackback"
block, id. at art. 10; outlaw blocking below the waist on a kick, id. at art. 6; outlaw contact
by a defensive player of an opponent above the shoulders, except to ward him off at the line,
Rule 12, § 2, art. 2; vary and expand facemasking rules, Rule 12, § 2, art. 5.
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4. Implementation and Enforcement
a. Federal Legislation
The only way to assure effective implementation and conscien-
tious administration of the two level plan is through a federally
imposed legislative mandate. While it is indeed true that some
sports are progressing in the area of level 1 on-the-field reforms246
many have done little to regularize review of their safety measures.
Moreover, in the realm of Non-Purposeful violence, the brutality
persists, becoming increasingly entrenched, and has yet to be sys-
tematically addressed. As has been explained, league directed con-
trols are necessary to deal effectively with the issues of professional
sports violence without infringing to an unacceptable degree on the
character of the American game.s 7 As the leagues are businesses
national in scope, the most practical manner of affecting the de-
sired action by the leagues appears to be federal legislation.
D. Highlights of the Proposal
1. The Confluence of the Models
To illustrate the effect of the Proposal, a second visit to the
graph of Purposeful/Non-Purposeful Violence onto the Player
Conduct Model indicates that the substantially heightened con-
straints cover a far greater portion of the excessively violent behav-
ior and, moreover, leave little or none of this behavior unpros-
cribed. Continuing rule reform efforts through level 1 of the
proposal effectively proscribe a gradually increasing portion of
Purposeful Violence. The portion of this violence lying in the C-
area grows less quickly due primarily to the continued existence of
the pragmatic restraints on civil actions, outlined in section III. B.
In the area of Non-Purposeful behavior, a dramatic increase in the
amount of such conduct which is proscribed - B-area - and a
corresponding decrease in that conduct remaining permissible -
A-area - reflects the comprehensive rules and enforcement mech-
anisms of level 2. The significant, though less striking increase in
the C-area reflects the fact that, with the greater amount of pro-
scribed conduct and the clear cut policy opposing such behavior,
the consent defense will be of limited use and the restraints on
player civil actions will be decreased somewhat. Nonetheless, the
246. See, e.g., id.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9 and infra text accompanying note 248
(discussing the issue of intrusiveness in the context of professional sports conduct reform).
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less substantial gains in this area are largely due to the persistence,
be it in a less virulent form, of many of the pragmatic forces which




POST-PROPOSAL-ANALYSIS OF RULE CHANGES
As noted earlier, Graphs 1 and 2 fail to account for the deterrent
effectiveness of the rule schemes they analyze. It is in this regard
that we concentrate upon the Individual Incentive Model analysis
of penalties. Rules like those encompassed in the Purposeful con-
duct reform measures of level 1 typically affect Individual Incen-
tive Factors 2-4 and are focused upon limited portions of a single
game. The Individual Incentive Model indicates that the penalties
imposed under the Non-Purposeful rule reform - level 2 - are
particularly effective because they incorporate the factors motivat-
ing individual conduct in a comprehensive and substantial manner.
Level 2 reforms may well be challenged as difficult to administer.
The argument would run that, particularly with respect to sports
incorporating physical contact, league officials could not possibly
1983
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determine which one of many dozen violent acts was executed with
an intent to intimidate. It would be added that the severe penalty
at stake would only worsen the task by placing a great cost on an
incorrect decision; the utility of the penalty would thus be dimin-
ished by officials' reluctance to use it.
The determination of intent to intimidate differs little from judi-
cial determinations of intent in a civil or criminal setting. Just as
members of society writ large must abide by such determinations
of its governing body, so would pro athletes be required to abide
by similar decisions of the governors of its occupational safety.
Moreover, league officials, unlike judges, would possess excellent
evidence (game films) and finely honed eyes for acceptable, con-
ventional behavior, making conclusions as to subjective intent far
more precise and fair. Many such determinations are made in the
existing course of play in areas such as unnecessary roughness and
palpably unfair acts.
2. Enforcement'- Injunctive Relief
In the event of professional sports leagues' non-compliance with
the legislative mandate, the Commission would engage its staff to
compile documentation of the breach and, with Justice Depart-
ment aid where required, institute action in federal court to seek
injunctive relief. Injunctions would be enforced against the disobe-
dient league's commissioner, the league's central governing body
and its several teams.2 48 The availability of injunctive relief and
248. A possible stumbling block for federal oversight of the several professional sports
leagues lies in the international nature of some of those leagues, especially hockey (the NHL
has eight Canadian teams) and Major League Baseball (there are two Canadian teams in the
American League and one in the National League). There is no assurance that Canadian
teams would abide by measures dictated by the U.S. Congress.
There exist at least two quite feasible solutions to this problem. One would arise out of
principles of comity, the hallmark of international law. In an effort to help facilitate a goal
sought by the United States and Canada alike, limiting sports violence, it is possible that
international channels can be employed to prompt the Canadian authorities to promulgate a
law substantially identical to the American one - delegating administrative control to the
United States Professional Sports Violence Commission. If the United States offers to
shoulder the complete costs of this body, it is possible that the Canadians would welcome
the effort; they would receive the benefits of the program -more civilized, safe professional
sports - without the financial costs of administration.
A second possible solution to the international issue would arise from the centralized
structure of the proposal: because the leagues institute the violence control mechanisms, no
problem of international law would arise once league compliance was attained. The single
difficulty with this approach results from the fact that the league offices of the NHL are
based in Canada. This notwithstanding, the fact that the clear majority of NHL teams are
American argues persuasively for the likelihood of obedience of the NHL officials.
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the possibility of bringing to a halt enterprises grossing hundreds
of millions of dollars annually suggests the effectiveness of enforce-
ment mechanisms which would encourage the leagues to proceed in
earnest to eliminate unnecessary violence.
3. Intrusiveness
A central aim of this proposal has been to eliminate extreme
levels of sports violence in the most unintrusive fashion. Compli-
cating this process is the key role violence has come to play in
many sports. The decentralized mechanism for rulemaking pervad-
ing this proposal represents an effort to effect change with the
least possible intrusiveness.
In practical terms, the several leagues are likely to be far less
adverse to the proposed sort of quasi-self-governance than other
measures which would lay the leagues entirely at the mercy of an
extraneous governing body. The lack of success met by legislative
efforts to curb sports violence may indeed stem largely from this
factor.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current interest in sports violence, manifested in legislative
proposals introduced in the Congress, is premised on the belief
that unnecessary violence in sports continues at unacceptable
levels. The Congressional interest and the steady commentary di-
rected at the problem of sports violence suggests that diverse pro-
posals will re-emerge and that Congress will not for long stay its
hand. Those who might otherwise look reluctantly on the prospect
of a governmental presence in sport must recognize the incipiency
of a major crackdown on sports violence. Accordingly, cost-effec-
tive and minimally intrusive measures to control sports violence
must be examined as alternatives to those which might control
sports violence only at an unacceptable cost.
Strident efforts to control violence which might subject athletes
to harsh judicial sanctions must be met with careful scrutiny -
lest we find ourselves making a demand of the galloping horse that
it swallow the bit for its grain. Rule reform provides the most di-
rect and efficient method of conduct modification in professional
sports. When the conduct expected of players is tied to the rules of
play, athletes are guided by a single standard and meaningful de-
terrence is possible. Any system of violence control must, in any
1983
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event, concede the inevitability of violence in sports, and efforts at
reform must be undertaken with this in mind.
